[烛光生存狂]-【翻译】克里斯蒂坦克在苏联

原文地址：http://www.battlefield.ru/content/view/19/50/lang,en/

PS:本文引用了原先412886049的翻译，再次表示真挚的感谢。

[quote]The end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s was characterized by the gradual sharpening of the struggle between various governments, which brought into greater focus the origins of World War II. Active military preparations took the form of actual growth of armies, modernization of armaments, and the militarization of economies and all aspects of societal life. The primary tendency in the development of armies of this period was their mechanization and motorization, the equipping of forces with tanks, aircraft, automatic weapons, artillery, and mortars.

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20世纪20年代初到30年代末这个时期的国际政治特点就是各国政府之间的矛盾不断加深,这也引起了人们对第二次世界大战爆发的严重关注.

军备竞赛的升级引起了军队数量的增长,军事装备的现代化,国民经济的军事化以及其他使社会生活为战争做准备的改变.在这个阶段的最重要的是为陆军研制新型的机械化和摩托化装备，包括坦克，飞机，自动武器，炮兵和迫击炮。

[quote]At this time the USSR was forced to take extreme measures to accelerate the development of its own defense industry, to re-equip the Armed Forces and for subsequent improvement of their combat capability. In July 1929 the Soviet government approved the first tank program, the goal of which was to bring into the inventory tankettes, light tanks, armored cars, self-propelled guns, tracked armored transporters, and other special vehicles.

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此时苏联开始加速发展自己的国防工业，为装甲部队换装以提高自身的战斗能力。1929年7月苏联政府批准了第一个坦克计划，目标是生产超轻型坦克，轻型坦克，装甲汽车，自行火炮，装甲牵引车和其他专用车辆。

[quote]At the end of November 1929, in connection with the falling behind of our own industry in the development of production of all types of tanks that met the armament requirements of the day, the chairman of the Revvoensoviet K. E. Voroshilov gave a report to the Council of Labor and Defense. On the basis of this report on 5 December a commission under the leadership of the deputy chairman of the SNK G. K. Ordzhonikidze decided to send abroad representatives of the military enterprises and industry to acquire examples of armaments and receive technical assistance regarding their production.

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1929年11月末，在意识到光靠本国的工业并不能生产出所有型号的坦克和武器装备后，陆海军人民委员兼革命军事委员会主席伏罗希洛夫（K.E.Voroshilov）递交给了劳动与国防委员会一份报告。在这份报告的基础上，12月5日，苏联人民委员会副主席奥尔忠尼启则（G.K.Ordzhonikidze）决定派一个军工企业代表团出访国外以获得技术和装备方面的经验和技术。

К．E．伏罗希洛夫(1881—1969)，苏联重要党和国家领导人。1935年被首次授予苏联元帅军衔的五个军事领导人之一。两次苏联英雄(1956、1968)。国内战争时期历任方面军军事委员会委员、集团军司令员、方面军司令员等职。战争结束后任军区司令员。1925—1934年任苏联陆海军人民委员、革命军事委员会主席。1934—1940年任国防人民委员。卫国战争时期任国防委员会委员、最高统帅部大本营成员，并先后任方向总司令、方面军司令员等职。战后历任苏联部长会议副主席、最高苏维埃主席。1926—1960年任苏共中央政治局(主席团)委员。——译者注

Г．К．奥尔忠尼启则(1886—1937)，苏联党和国家领导人，格鲁吉亚籍。国内战争中历任集团军、方面军军事委员会委员等职。1920年起先后任俄共(布)外高加索边疆区第一书记、中央监察委员会主席、苏联人民委员会副主席、劳动与国防委员会副主席等职。1930年起任联共(布)中央政治局委员。1937年2月18日自杀。——译者注

[quote]The commission, headed up by the chief of the UMM of the RKKA, I. A. Khalepskiy, went abroad on 30 December 1929. Having visited Germany, Czechoslovakia, France, and Great Britain, the commission arrived in the USA for the purpose of purchasing the small tanks T-1 and E-1 from the Cunningham firm. The results of tests that had been conducted indicated that these vehicles possessed a movement speed some 8 km/h less than the English Vickers tank that had already been purchased. The engine and transmission constantly overheated and the enormous tracks were an obstacle to the achievement of the desired movement speed. At the same time, the price of these two tanks was 175.5 thousand rubles higher and the commercial demands of the Cunningham firm were absolutely unacceptable: its representatives set forth conditions in accordance with which the Soviet side was to purchase a minimum of 50 vehicles with a 50 percent down payment. In addition, the firm categorically refused to provide technical assistance or engineers to visit Soviet production facilities. For all of these reasons talks regarding the purchase of these tanks were broken off.

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工农红军摩托化和机械化部副部长К．Б．卡利诺夫斯基的代表团在1929年12月30日出访。访问了德国，捷克斯洛伐克，法国和英国，代表团也到了美国意图购买Cunningham公司的T-1和E-1小型坦克。测试表明这些坦克的速度和已经购买的英国Vickers坦克相比慢了8公里/小时，。发动机和传动装置经常过热，庞大的履带使得坦克很难达到所预期的速度。同时，两辆坦克高昂的价格以及Cunningham公司所提出的商业要求完全不能令人接受：苏联至少购买50辆坦克并且要先付50%的定金。另外，公司也断然拒绝提供技术援助或者派工程师到苏联来帮助建立生产设备。基于以上的几点最后没有购买该型坦克.

[quote]On this same trip the commission representatives became acquainted with John Walter Christie and his fast tank, which at that time was still being designed. Contrary to expectations, the tanks did not make the desired impression on the head of the commission, I. A. Khalepskiy, who at the time was still enthralled with the TG tank designed by German engineer E. Grotte. But just the same Khalepskiy had brought with him a tentative agreement for the possible purchase of a Christie tank. When it came down to securing the ability to produce these tanks, the Soviet government loosened its purse strings.

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在此次行程中代表团通过介绍认识了John Walter Christie和他的快速坦克，此时仍旧处于设计阶段。和期望相反，坦克并没有给I.A.Khalepskiy留下很深刻的印象，此时他仍旧着迷于德国工程师E.Grotte设计的TG坦克。但是Khalepskiy和John Walter Christie关于可能购买一辆Christie坦克有了一个初步协议。当它有能力开始稳定生产这些坦克后，苏联政府将放宽资金流向。

[quote]Having agreed on a number of issues, the USSR purchased from John Christie two improved experimental tank chassis, named by the designer the M-1930 (model 1930). Here it should be emphasized that despite what has been written in many publications, not whole tanks were purchased but only their chassis.

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一系列的协议，苏联政府从约翰-克里斯蒂公司购买了两辆改进的实验坦克底盘，被命名为M1930。需要强调的是即使很多出版物都提到了，但是当时仅仅是购买了底盘而不是整辆坦克。

[quote]The primary reason for the purchase of the Christie M-1930 tank was first of all the technical assistance offered by the firm, and the delivery of all production blueprints and the technological process of the production of the tank. John Christie also expressed his willingness to come to the USSR for a period of two months for consultations and to help organize production. In addition, the firm gave the opportunity to our engineer to work at the plant in Rahway, New Jersey. This technical assistance was not extended for the Liberty engine, because these were already being produced in the USSR under license under the label M-5.

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由公司提供所有的技术援助,递交所有的生产蓝图和生产坦克的技术工序.John Christie也表示愿意用两个月的时间来到苏联参加磋商会和帮助组织生产.另外,公司也给了苏联工程师机会来到新泽西的Rahway工厂学习工作.在这些技术援助中没有包括自由发动机,是因为苏联已经获得了生产许可证来生产本国的M-5发动机.

[quote]The issue of whether the sale of the Christie tanks was confirmed in writing or only by an oral agreement has been discussed in various ways in many publications. Judging by available documents, adherents of both sides are correct. Indeed, on 28 April 1930 an agreement was signed between the firm U.S. Wheel Track Layer Corporation and AMTORG (the trade organization that represented the interests of the USSR in the USA) for the delivery to the Soviet Union of two military tanks with a total cost of $US 60,000. Delivery of the tanks is to be accomplished not later than four months from date of agreement signing. In the document the parties also agreed to: Delivery of spare parts for the purchased tanks for the sum of $US 4,000, and also the right of production, sale, and use of the tanks inside the borders of the USSR for ten years (Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Collection 31811, file 374, sheets 5, 6). Christie was paid an additional $100,000 for sale of production rights, transfer of patents, and services in the area of technical cooperation. John W. Christie, president of the corporation, signed the agreement on the American side andpresident, president of AMTORG, signed on the Soviet side in the presence of I. A. Khalepskiy (USSR), John Michael, John Raymond, and Tiffany (all of the USA). Altogether the Soviet Union had to pay the sum of $US 160,000.

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关于购买克里斯蒂坦克是签了协议了或者仅仅只有口头协议一直都有很多的争论。分析保存下来的资料，这两种观点都是正确的。1930年4月28日，U.S. Wheel Track Layer Corporation公司和AMTORG (对美贸易公司)签定了一份协议：“购买两辆坦克总价60000美金，坦克应该在协议签署后的不迟于四个月的时间内送到,协议中双方还同意:生产坦克的备件总共4000美金，10年内苏联有权在其境内生产,销售,使用该坦克.”Christie又以100000美金转让了生产许可权,专利权和其他一些技术合作服务。作为公司的董事长John W. Christie作为美方代表签定了协议。AMTORG的主席 I. A. Khalepskiy(苏联人), John Michael, John Raymond, and Tiffany (此3人为美国人)作为苏方代表签定了协议。苏联为这次交易一共支付了160000美金.

[quote]However, there was also an oral agreement between Christie and Khalepskiy. Khalepskiy referred to this in his report about the visit to the USA.

«During my visit with Christie no documents were signed, but an oral agreement was reached regarding the sale of two tanks to us.»

Christie, in his own 7 October 1931 letter to the AMTORG director, Gobar, states:

«In this letter I draw for the last time your attention to the agreement personally reached between Mr. Khalepskiy, yourself, the author of this letter [Christie — trans.], and other members of your commission, who were witnesses to the fact that the contract concluded with me orally should be fulfilled notwithstanding the legal technical requirements and changes.»

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不过,在Christie和Khalepskiy之间也有一个口头协议,Khalepskiy在提交的关于访问美国的报告中提到:"我访问克里斯蒂期间没有签署任何协议,但口头上达成了销售2辆坦克给我们的意向."

Christie在他1931年1月7号给AMTORG经理Gobar的信中提到:"在这封信中我最后一次提醒你这个协议是Khalepskiy先生,你,这封信的作者(即Christie-译者注)和你的委员会中那些成员私人间达成的,这些人要见证虽然这个协议是我口头达成的,但仍要执行那些技术性的法律需求和变化.

[quote]Based on all of this, it can be concluded that Soviet military personnel indeed reached an oral agreement with Christie for the delivery of tanks. And because at that time the Soviet Union and the United States did not have diplomatic relations, in order to export the tanks without problems a written agreement had to be signed with AMTORG, the single organization that officially represented the trade interests of the USSR in the USA.

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基于以上内容,可以肯定的是苏联军队和克里斯蒂公司在坦克的运输问题上达成的是口头协议.由于那时苏联和美国还没有外交关系,所以为了保证出口坦克不出问题,由AMTORG出面签定协议.

[quote]Having returned from the USA in June 1930, Khalepskiy presented to the RVS a report regarding his foreign travel in which the Christie tank was characterized as an extremely fast-moving tank with independent wheel-track movement:

«Taking into account that by its speed the Christie surpasses all other tanks in the world, and that the Poles intend to build it, we could fall into a very unfavorable position from the point of view of tactical employment of tank units. In connection with this, I urgently recommend that we press ahead with the production of the Christie tank by reducing the production of the Liberty engine in aviation plants and preparing for the production of other components at the Yaroslavl Automobile Plant. I recommend that for the current 1930–31 years we give industry the task of building not less than 100 Christie tanks.»

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在1930年6月从美国回来后, Khalepskiy 向革命军事委员会（RVS）报告了他在国外出差的情况,特别指出克里斯蒂坦克的主要特征就是它是一种可以采用轮式-履带移动的非常快速的坦克:“考虑到克里斯蒂坦克的速度，它已经超越了世界上其他的坦克。而且波兰人也正打算制造这型坦克（波兰那时是苏联的主要假想敌），我们可能在坦克部队的战术使用上陷入一种不利的境地。我紧急建议我们减少航空工厂的自由引擎的生产而将克里斯蒂坦克的生产提前，同时在雅罗斯拉夫尔汽车工厂准备其他备件的生产。我建议在1930到1931年间给工业界定下生产至少100辆克里斯蒂坦克的指标。”

[quote]However, despite of some publications state «the Russians were fascinated by genius Christie tank», in this report it estimates quite conservative:

«...Despite of its high speed that, by assurance of the Americans, exceeds 45 km/h on tracks and 70 km/h on wheels... this tank is not good enough to be accepted for service».

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不过,尽管在一些出版物中提到:俄国人完全着迷于Christie坦克的性能,在这份报告中还是非常的保守:“...尽管美国人保证在使用履带时能达到45公里/小时,用负重轮达到70公里/小时...这种坦克还没有好到足以服役的程度.”

[quote]It turned out that the Christie tank was viewed rather as a temporary measure for the creation of our own fast tank.

The matter of the production of the Christie tank at Yaroslavl Automobile Plant was discussed at an expanded session of the RVS with industry representatives, which was convened from 1 to 5 July 1930, under the agenda topic, «Regarding tank issues.»

For the purposes of studying the organization of production and control for the fulfillment of the order, a member of the NTK, N. M. Toskin, arrived in New York on 14 July 1930. Making contact with the designer of the ordered vehicles, he received on behalf of Khalepskiy 127 pages of blueprints of the experimental tank and an assurance that Christie intended to come to Moscow with the vehicles.

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不过克里斯蒂坦克只是苏联人创造自己的快速坦克前的一个短暂的过度。在革命军事委员会（RVS）在1930年7曰1号到5号召开的一次有工业界代表参加的扩大会议上，在《关于坦克问题》的议题中讨论了在雅罗斯拉夫尔汽车工厂生产克里斯蒂坦克的计划。

为了学习如何组织生产和控制合约的执行，科技委员会（NTK）的一位成员N. M. Toskin，在1930年7月14日来到的纽约，和坦克的设计师进行了接触，他经Khalepskiy的帮助获得了127页的实验坦克的设计蓝图，并且得到了Christie本人将要和坦克车体一起抵达莫斯科的保证。

[quote]The blueprints arrived in Moscow on 9 August 1930 and were immediately transferred to the head designer of the main design bureau under the auspices of the State All-union Gun-Armaments-Machine Gun Enterprise, S. P. Shukalov. After copies of these blueprints were made, on 13 October 1930 all of them were returned to the ABTU.

N~In accordance with the agreement, Christie was required to deliver two vehicles by September 1930 to a representative of AMTORG. But, despite his best efforts, he managed fully to complete these vehicles only by the end of that year. The assembled and tested vehicles were shipped from New York to the USSR in the last days of December 1930.

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坦克的设计蓝图在1930年8月9日到达莫斯科，然后立刻被翻译出来送给了在全苏联火炮-军备-机枪公司下属的主要设计局的首席设计师S. P. Shukalov 。在所有的蓝图都被拷贝后，它们被送回了装甲坦克兵局（ABTU）。

根据合约，克里斯蒂公司要将两辆坦克车体在1930年9月送给对美贸易公司（AMTORG）的代表。但尽管尽了他最大的努力，两辆车体还是拖到了这一年年底才完成。组装好的测试车体在1930年12月的最后一天才从纽约登船运往苏联。

[quote]Meanwhile, on 21 November 1930, the RVS of the USSR approved the Christie tank for production. The question regarding the designation of this tank had arisen somewhat earlier, in view of the fact that all designations up through T-34 had already been assigned for three years hence. However, the decision of the head of the UMM, expressed in a letter of 11 January 1931, was firm:

«Since the American Christie tank does not meet the requirements of a tank-tractor-armored combat vehicle, and has not been accepted into the inventory, it will not receive the comprehensive designation „T‛. The suggestion to give it the designation „ST‛ or „BT‛ [skorostnoy tank or bystrokhodnyy tank, both of which mean „fast tank‛ in English — trans.] is more rational.»

This same decision led to the conspicuous name «Soviet Christie». An order of the VSNKh of the USSR was issued on 23 May 1931, which decreed that the Christie tank was to be introduced into the «system of tank-tractor-armored car armaments of the RKKA» as a tank destroyer.

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同时,1930年11月21日,革命军事委员会（RVS）批准Christie坦克投入生产。而这型坦克的命名上的问题更早的就被提出来了，因为直到T-34的所有的坦克名字在三年前就被分配掉了。但是，红军摩托化和机械化管理局（UMM）的头目在1931年1月11日的一封信中表示：“由于克里斯蒂坦克不能满足一辆坦克-牵引车-装甲车辆的条件，而且也没有进入装备清单当中，所以它不会得到一个正式的以‘T’开头的命名，建议其使用更合适的以‘ST’或‘BT’开头的命名（BT指bystrokhodnyy tank，ST指skorostnoy tank ，在英语中这两者都是快速坦克的意思).

这个决定导致了那个引人注目的的名字“苏联的克里斯蒂”的诞生。来自苏联最高人民经济委员会（VSNKh）的一个命令在1931年3月23号颁布，以法令的形式决定了克里斯蒂坦克将作为一型坦克歼击车加入苏联红军的坦克-牵引车-装甲车辆体系。

[quote]Both vehicles that arrived in the USSR in early 1931 were subjected to careful examination and testing. In particular, the tank that had the factory number 2051 was received on 4 March 1931 for examination at depot #127 of the ABTU. After brief familiarization with the tank by representatives of the UMM of the RKKA, on 14 March this test model arrived at the testing department, where, in accordance with instructions of the chief of UMM of the RKKA, familiarization with its technical components and demonstration of the purchased vehicle was conducted until 16 May under the guidance of the chief of the section Gromov and engineer of the tank station Lavrentev. Countless delegations of the leadership component of the RKKA were familiarized with the new item from the end of March to 16 April, on the whole creating a good impression on them. Therefore a joint session «Concerning the tank program for the plant for 1931» was convened at the «Bolshevik» plant on 24 April 1931. The list of participants at this session attests to the importance of the question under consideration: K. E. Voroshilov, Tukhachevskiy, Slavin (RVS LVO [Revolutionary Military Council of the Leningrad Military District]), Karpenko (OGPU), Litunovskiy, Khalepskiy, Lebedev (UMM), Salnikov (plant director), K. K. Sirkin, Zabrezhevskiy (plant technical director), and as well other representatives of the plant and workshops.

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在1931年早些时候到达了苏联的两辆坦克车体都经过了仔细的检查和测试。特别是工厂编号2051的那辆车体在1931年3月4号在装甲坦克兵局

（ABTU）的#127号车厂接受了检查。3月14号，在红军摩托化和机械化管理局（UMM）和苏联红军（RKKA)的代表熟悉了这型坦克后，这辆测试车体抵达了测试部门，在那里，根据红军摩托化和机械化管理局（UMM）和苏联红军（RKKA)首领的指示，继续对坦克的技术备件进行熟悉。两辆购回的车体一直在格罗莫夫局和罗芬铁夫坦克局的领导的指导下进行展示直到3月16号。苏联红军各部门的数不清的代表团都在4月16号后来熟悉这型新坦克。他们对这型坦克的印象总体上还不错。因此一个名为《关于该型坦克在1931年的计划方案》的联席会议在1931年4月24号于《布尔什维克》工厂召开，这次会议的重要与会者包括 K. E. Voroshilov, Tukhachevskiy, Slavin（革命军事委员会列宁格勒区代表）,Karpenko（国家政治保卫总局代表）, Litunovskiy, Khalepskiy, Lebedev （红军摩托化和机械化管理局代表）, Salnikov （工厂经理）, K. K. Sirkin, Zabrezhevskiy （技术工厂经理），当然还有其他工厂和车间的代表。

[quote]The resolution that came out of this session stated in part:

«The plant accepts the order for production in the current year (1931) of 100 „BT‛ (Christie) tanks under the conditions of supply of its rolled hardened armor, the development of the working blueprints of which will be carried out by a special tank design bureau, which at the present time is completing the working blueprints for the T-26. In connection with the production of the „BT‛, future output of the T-18 is hereby eliminated.»

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下面是这次会议所作出的部分决议：

“工厂在接收了提供的硬化轧制的坦克装甲的条件下要在当前年份（1931）生产100辆‘BT’（克里斯蒂）坦克。工作蓝图的研究将由现在正在完成T-26工作蓝图的设计局来完成。为了保证BT坦克的生产，T-18坦克的生产特此取消。

[quote]However these plans would not be realized. In fact, the financial planning commission of the NKV noted the production of 150 TG medium tanks of the German designer E. Grote. But because of delay in the preparation of a test model of the new type of medium tank, the deputy chairman of the RVS Uborevich on the suggestion of Khalepskiy decided to order production of 200 T-24 medium tanks in place of the TG at the KhPZ. But because a production agreement had not been concluded even by the end of 1931, at the beginning of May, 1932, the Commission for the Defense of the USSR revisited the issue of the possibility of production of the Christie BT at the KhPZ.

[/quote]

但这些计划将不会被实现。装备（武器）人民委员会下属的经济计划委员会比较中意150辆由德国设计师 E. Grote设计的TG中型坦克的生产。但由于新型中型坦克的试验型号的准备工作的延迟，革命军事委员会（RVS）的副主席 Uborevich 在 Khalepskiy 的建议下，决定在哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂（KhPZ）生产200辆T-24中型坦克以代替TG坦克的生产。但由于生产协议直到1931年年底都没有达成，苏联国防委员会开始重新考虑在哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂（KhPZ）生产克里斯蒂BT坦克的可能性。

[quote]The selection was not accidental, since the plant's production base permitted practically complete preparation of the tank. By cooperation it was planned to prepare only radiators, conical drive hubs for the transmission and cast parts of high-quality steel.

C,Here it is necessary to note that the KhPZ began the organization of tank production from the basis of some experience. The plant staff had gained some experience in the repair of captured foreign tanks already in 1920–23, when the plant repaired approximately 30 captured tanks. The plant had been serially producing «Kommunar» track-laying tractors since 1924 and had now transitioned to the construction of more powerful and modernized «Komintern» tractor. Beginning in 1925 the plant had begun to use gas and electric welding in the production of steam locomotives. The cadre of workers, managers, designers, metallurgists, and technicians had grown during these years.

[/quote]

这个选择不是偶然的，哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂的生产基础允许它完成克里斯蒂坦克的生产准备。通过合作它只生产坦克的散热器，传动装置的圆锥形推进插孔和高质量钢制成的模型部件。

这里有必要提及一下哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂组织坦克生产是以其过去的那些经验为基础的。工厂员工在1920-1923年通过修理大约30辆俘获来的外国坦克获得一定的经验。哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂从1924年起就开始连续的生产 «Kommunar» 型铺轨拖拉机，而这时已经过渡到生产更强力且现代化的«Komintern» 型拖拉机。从1925年开始工厂开始在蒸汽机车的生产中使用电焊和气焊。技术工人，经理，设计师，冶金技师和技术员的数量在这几年中都有增长。

[quote]I"In a 17 May 1931 order of the Peoples' Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, the chief of the UMM RKKA devised a plan for accomplishment of the government's decision for organization of production of the Christie BT at KhPZ. This plan envisioned:

«1. Preparation of the working blueprints by 15.07.31 (one month) by SKB under the supervision of the chief of the design bureau of the armaments combine S. A. Ginzburg using 20 engineers and designers from GKB #8 of the armaments combine; 15 engineers and designers from NATI VATO; two hull designers from Izhorsk Plant; from UMM, Toskin as deputy chief of the design bureau and Rozhkov as designer for ammunition and turret production; and the full staff of the KhPZ Aleksenko tank design bureau. In addition, from 10.06 the director of the supports the bureau with 30 copiers [people who reproduced blueprints by hand — Valeri P.].KhPZ

2. Five highly qualified specialists from Ukrgipromash for development of the technical processes of production of the tank.

3. Assemble the KhPZ BT special bureau by 25.05.31.

4. Prepare three test models by 15.09.31, two by KhPZ and one by the test section of the „Bolshevik‛ plant with delivery of castings and forgings from KhPZ.

5. Preparation of the first run of 100 tanks: 20 by 01.11.31 [1st November — trans.], 30 by 30.12., and 50 by 01.01.32.»

[/quote]

在1931年5月17日ujunhe海军食物人民委员会的一个命令里，红军摩托化和机械化管理局的主席决定了一个计划以完成政府决定的在哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂生产克里斯蒂BT坦克的打算。这个计划内容如下：

1.由独立设计局下联合武器设计局主席 S. A. Ginzburg 领导的设计队伍完成生产蓝图的准备工作，此工作须在1931年7月15号之前完成。这个队伍成员包括包括20名#8总设计局的工程师和设计师，15名全苏火炮弹药联合体的工程师和设计师，2名Izhorsk工厂的车体设计师，来自红军摩托化和机械化管理局的Toskin担任副主席，Rozhkov则作为弹药和炮塔生产的设计师，团队还包括哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂Aleksenko坦克设计局的全部员工。此外，到了6月10号，设计团队中还增加了30名哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂的拷贝员（他们负责将设计师画出的蓝图进行手工拷贝）。

2.五名来自 Ukrgipromash 的十分合格的专家将参与坦克的技术性生产过程。

3.哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂将在31年5月25号成立专门的BT坦克局。

4.在31年9月15号准备好3辆测试用车。其中2辆在哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂制造，1辆在布尔什维克工厂的测试车间通过用哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂送来的锻铸造部件制造。

5.第一批计划生产100辆BT坦克，到31年11月1号生产20辆，至12月30号再生产30辆，到32年1月1号再生产50辆。

[quote]Practically all five points of this plan formed the basis of the Order of the VSNKh #73 of 21.05.31 regarding the organization of production of the BT at KhPZ and the creation of the design bureau. The final decision on organization of production of the Christie tank was reflected in Protocol #6 of the Commission of Defense, «Concerning tank design,» of 23 May 1931:

«The RVS USSR is permitted to introduce the Christie tank into the system of Auto-Armored-Tank-Tractor Armaments of the RKKA as a fast tank destroyer (BT).

In ten days Voroshilov and Ordzhonikidze will have to reach final agreement on the maximum number of BT (in existing form, without any changes) that can be produced at KhPZ in 1931, bearing in mind the complete cancellation of orders for the T-24.

Simultaneously RVS is obligated to push forward for modernization of the Christie tank.»

[/quote]

实际上以上五点内容都是基于最高人民经济委员会为了在哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂生产BT坦克和创建专门的设计局而在31年5月21日发布的#73命令。最终决定开始生产克里斯蒂坦克的命令是1931年5月23号国防委员会发布的 #6命令《关于坦克的设计》：

“苏联革命军事委员会允许将克里斯蒂坦克作为一型快速坦克引进如苏联红军的自动-装甲-坦克-机动武器体系。

在10天内将由Voroshilov 和 Ordzhonikidze 决定BT（原文如此）坦克1931年在哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂的生产数量，这将影响到T-24的最终停产。

同时革命军事委员会有责任进一步推进克里斯蒂坦克的现代化。”

[quote]At this time work for study of the first model of the Christie had just begun at the test range. The tank that arrived for testing was a light combat wheeled-tracked vehicle with a classic arrangement. The forward portion of the hull contained the driver's compartment with a centrally positioned driver-mechanic. The middle portion of the hull held the combat compartment and the rear of the hull the engine-transmission compartment. The turret with armaments was absent. Entry of the crew into the tank was accomplished through the driver's hatch. The vehicle's crew consisted of two persons. Upon conduct of the technical inspection on 16 May 1931, it was determined that entry and exit of the two crew members was possible in 10 to 20 seconds, but only through the turret opening, because the forward (driver's) hatch was too narrow for passage.

The vehicle's armor was sufficient to protect the crew and internal components against small arms fire. The tank's hull was riveted from armor plates with a thickness of from 5.5 to 14 millimeters.

The engine-transmission compartment housed a 400 h.p. «Liberty» aircraft engine mounted longitudinally.

The driver-mechanic steered the tank with the aid of a detachable steering wheel. However, when necessary the tank could be turned in place using steering levers intended for driving the vehicle when it was moving on tracks. During movement on wheels the tracks were stowed on shelves above the wheels and secured to these shelves with leather straps.

[/quote]

这次克里斯蒂坦克的研究工作开始于测试层级。来进行测试的一辆标准配置的轻型轮履混合战斗车体。车体前部是中间放置的驾驶员的舱室。车体中部是战斗舱室，后部则是引擎和传动系统舱室。这时炮塔还没有安装。车组成员进入坦克都要通过驾驶员的舱口。车组成员包括两个人。在1931年5月1号的技术检查中，可以肯定的认为车组的两名成员可以在10到20秒的时间内进出坦克，但是这需要在炮塔入口打开的情况下才能达成，因为驾驶员舱口太窄了。

车体的装甲足够保护车组成员和车内仪器抵挡轻型武器的射击。坦克车体上铆接着5.5-14毫米的装甲板。

引擎-传动舱室里纵向放置着400马力的«Liberty» 航空引擎。

驾驶员通过操纵可拆分的方向盘驾驶坦克。不过，当使用履带时则必须要使用控制杠杆。在使用负重轮行驶时，履带被放置在翼子板上并用皮带进行固定。

[quote]The tank suspension was by individual springs. Each side of the tank housed four aluminum rubber-lined road wheels of 813 mm diameter. The guide and drive wheels for tracked movement had external rubber cushioning. The large-block track, consisting of 46 individual track blocks, interfaced with the drive wheels by means of large, flat paddles.

An 800 kg ballast was installed in the tank in place of the absent turret with armament during testing. A number of deficiencies were revealed during the first external inspection, such as an absence of vision ports in the driver's hatch, and also the impossibility of access to the basic power plant assembly and transmission without removing the engine-transmission compartment cover.

The weighing of the tank with ballast, but without crew, was conducted on 16 May: 9360 kg. Automotive testing of the vehicle was begun on this same day. Over the next 10 days the tank was driven 150 km on wheels and tracks. The tank had been driven an additional 50 km earlier, during plant testing before its delivery to the USSR.

[/quote]

坦克的每侧都安装有四个直径813mm铝制橡胶轮缘负重轮.在使用履带时诱导轮和主动轮的外缘都用橡胶包裹.履带由46片履带片组成，履带通过大而平的拨片联接在驱动轮上。

在测试中用800公斤的压舱物被装在坦克上以替代炮塔和武备.在外部审查的过程中发现了一些问题,比如:驾驶员舱门缺乏观察窗，没有为基本的动力设备部件准备入口，传动装置没有移除舱室包装。

5月16日测试的坦克在使用压舱物,没有配备人员的情况下,车重达到9360公斤.车辆的行驶测试也在同一天开始.10天后车辆使用履带和负重轮共开了150公里.在它被送到苏联之前已经在工厂的测试中跑了50公里.

[quote]The failure of John Christie to develop his tank design in full was immediately made obvious. On the second day of automotive testing, 17 May, during a turn on grass, the right idler arm mount broke (see photo).

Two subsequent days were spent in repair of the tank. But the welding held for only 500 meters of movement on tracks. On 23 May, after a second broken right idler arm mount, the tank was again sent in for repair, which took three days to accomplish.

The tank was subjected to running on hard surface and dirt roads only on its wheels from 27 May to 13 June. The maximum speed did not exceed 65 to 70 km/h. The impossibility of movement on wheels in sand because of significant miring in the soil turned out to be a substantial deficiency.

[/quote]

John Christie不能完成他的坦克设计变得非常明显.在行驶测试的第二天,也就是5月17日,在草地上的一次转弯过程中,车辆右侧的诱导轮支架发生了破裂.

两天后坦克被送去修理.但是焊接只保持了仅仅在使用履带时的500米.55月23日,右侧诱导轮支架再次破裂.坦克只能再次送去修理,三天后完成.

从5月27日到6月13日坦克用负重轮在硬质路面和土路进行了测试.最高时速没有超过65-70公里/小时.负重轮无法在沙地上行驶，因为这对坦克来说会造成显著的下陷。

[quote]The ability of the tank to overcome natural and man-made obstacles was demonstrated to government representatives on 7 June. But a full demonstration of the tank's capabilities was not possible because of the breaking of the idler wheel mount. The tank freely passed over five rows of barbed wire on its wheels, and then overcame a two-meter ditch.

The tank's crew spent 44 minutes in mounting the tracks, and after a 10-minute break spent 35 minutes in removing them and placing them back in their stowage position.

After the vehicle was demonstrated to the government representatives the testing was extended. On 13 June still another, last attempt was made to test the tank running on its tracks. But, after the tank had moved just 1 km, the ill-fated idler arm mount broke again. Three days later the gearbox began to malfunction in 2d and 3d gears.

[/quote]

6月7日,在给政府代表的展示中坦克成功的克服了自然和人工的障碍.但是整个的坦克能力展示因为诱导轮支架的破裂不可能完成.坦克的负重轮成功的通过了由5排铁丝组成的障碍,然后克服了2米宽的壕沟.

坦克乘员花费了44分钟来为坦克安装履带,在休息了10分钟之后,又花费了35分钟把履带拆了下来并放回到翼子板上.

之后展示给政府代表的测试被延长,6月13日又一次,也是最后一次使用履带来对坦克的行驶进行测试.但是,坦克仅开动了一公里,倒霉的诱导轮支架再次发生破裂.三天后变速箱在2挡和3挡发生故障.

[quote]During this entire period of testing from 16 May to 21 June the tank was driven 43.5 km on its tracks and 863 km on its wheels.Some 15 pages of detailed data were collected as a result of testing. In particular, it was noted that the tank failed to undergo complete testing because of breakage of the idler arm mount.

...The tank was tested only on its wheels, during which it was shown that the average speed on hard surface roads did not exceed 30 to 35 km/h. After 4 to 5 hours the driver was extremely tired (because of difficulty in steering and ride roughness). The engine worked well but frequent adjustment of the valves was necessary. The batteries are inadequate for starting of the engine (as a rule, a cold engine was started by towing).

[/quote]

从5月16日到6月21日整个的测试过程中,坦克使用履带行驶了43.5公里.使用负重轮是863公里.关于这次测试一共整理了15页的测试报告.需要注意的是,在报告中提到了坦克因为诱导轮支架破裂导致整个测试失败.

...坦克在测试中仅使用负重轮,可以匀速在硬质路面上行驶但最高不超过30到35公里/小时.在4到5小时后驾驶员会变得非常疲劳(因为驾驶非常困难和座椅设计的很粗糙).发动机表现很好但是需要频繁调节气门.电池在启动发动机时显得很不充分.(按照规定,冷却的发动机由电池来驱动).

[quote]After 600 to 650 km, 2nd and 3rd gears of the transmission malfunctioned under heavy engine loads. The lubricant leaks under pressure and shifting of all gears is difficult. After 2 to 3 hours of movement the transmission heats up to a temperature of 85° to 88°Ñ in an ambient air temperature of 35°to 40°.

Tracks. Eight pins broke after 40.5 kilometers.Drive wheels. Disintegration of the exterior surface of 1.5 to 2 cm magnitude was observed after 150 to 200 kilometers.

Tank steering is satisfactory. On dirt roads it refuses to respond to the steering wheel, and during driving on uneven terrain the wheel can be snatched from the driver's hands. The vehicle is difficult to steer at 55 to 60 km/h...

[/quote]

在行驶了600到650公里后,由于发动机过载导致传动装置的2挡和3挡发生故障.润滑剂渗漏使得换挡变得很困难.2到3个小时的行驶后传动装置的温度会上升到85°到88°,而室外空气温度只有35-40°.

坦克的履带销在40.5公里后会破裂.在150-200公里后,可以在主动轮的表面可以看到一个1.5到2厘米大小的破裂口.

坦克的操控令人满意.在土路上它基本上对方向盘的操作没有反应,在55-60公里/小时的情况下车辆很难被操作.

[quote]The Christie tank in that form in which it was presented for testing is an exceptionally interesting vehicle with universal drive. As a combat vehicle it requires significant development and the introduction of a number of design improvements and changes.

Already at this time, when automotive testing of the experimental model had begun, on 1 June 1931 the chairman of the NTK UMM RKKA (Lebedev) sent to the director of KhPZ (Vladimirov) a tasking approved by the Chief of UMM RKKA (Khalepskiy) for planning of the Soviet production of the wheeled-tracked BT tank.

[/quote]

克里斯蒂坦克在测试中展示了它是一种有着很不寻常行驶能力的特殊的坦克。座位一型战斗车辆它需要更进一步的发展并要引入一大批改进的设计和改装。

在实验型号接收机动性能测试的同时，1931年6月1号红军摩托化和机械化管理局的主席派了一个人去指导哈尔科夫蒸汽机车制造厂为红军生产这种轮履复合的BT坦克的事宜。

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