[烛光生存狂]-苏联IS-2战斗报告

http://www.militar.org.ua/foro/tanque-is-2-versus-tiger-ii-t12081-75.html

Indications of the military council on the 1st Ukrainian front on the combat use of IS-122 tank regiments and ISU-152 self-propelled artillery regiments May 29, 1944.

Commander-in-chief of forces of 1st Ukrainian front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev

Member of the military council the 1st Ukrainian front the lieutenant general, K.Kraynyukov

On 29 May, 1944.

Only (to be distributed?):

By commanders OF [BT] and mV by the armies

Commanding of the tank armies

To commander OF [BT] and mV KA

The combat employment of heavy tank and self-propelled artillery regiments has shown that IS-122 and ISU-152 are the best weapons to deal with the heavy tanks of the enemy (Tiger and Panther), with the heavy self-propelled gun (Ferdinand); and also with bunkers and strongpoints (ДОТ?).

IS-122 tank regiments and ISU-152 self-propelled artillery regiments are given to increase the strengh of tank, mechanized, and in certain cases rifle corps.

Combat employment of IS-22 tank regiments and ISU-152 self-propelled artillery regiments within tank and mechanized units has a large combat effect, which is confirmed by the military operations of these regiments in the 1st Ukrainian front.

I. Examples of the combat use of IS-122 tanks and ISU-152 self-propelled units

The enemy, starting on 14.4.44, repeatedly attacked the position of 135 (SD?) and 53 guard tank brigade aiming to achieve a breakthrough from the fortified position, to Kupshintse, and to surrounded units in Tarnopol.

On the night of 16.4.44, 11 IS-2 from 11 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment arrived to the positions of 53 Guards Tank brigade (GTBr). Three companies of regiment took up defense in the southwestern and western outskirts (To Pochapintse). One company, placed under command of 53 GTBr, was located behind the battle formation of medium tanks. Its role was to support them by firing from stationary positions.

At 10:30 of 16.4.44 enemy forces of 25 tanks and two battalions of infantry attacked. At 16:00 there was another attack, this time by 40 tanks.

With the price of large losses for enemy it was possible to make room the battle formations of 53 GTBr.

One company of heavy tanks, located beyond (behind) the combat formations of medium tanks, opened sudden intensive fire against enemy tanks from stationary positions at a distance of 1500-2000m. As a result 13 tanks burned (Three Tigers and ten Panthers). In this combat especial mention of the following crews is made: Lieutenant comrade Vovk, who destroyed 4 tanks, of them a Tiger; and the Guards crew of Lieutenant Timokhin, who destroyed 3 enemy tanks, one of them being a Tiger.

The attack of the enemy was repelled, and the remaining tanks pulled back to initial positions.

72 Guards Heavy tank regiment was attached to 11 Guards Tank Corps to increase the strength. Its task was to perform ambushes in the second echelon from 1.5 to 2kms of the front edge of our troops. It engaged in ambushes on the region of farmsteads, north of Gerasimov.

At 11 hours on 20.4.44 the enemy broke through the defensive positions at Podvertse and Zhivachuv; heavy and medium tanks continued to advance to the southeast. Our IS-122 tanks opened direct fire from 1.5kms. As a result fire at the first moment of battle it was set fire by 6 and are hit 3 tanks of enemy, of them 6 “tigers”.

On 21.4 at dawn, tanks took defensive positions at the front line, behind reverse slope of hills. They were advanced to the deliberate [poluzakrytye] positions. Tanks covered by infantry of 40 [GTBr] and by regular sub-machine gunners.

In two days of combat the regiment hit and destroyed 25 tanks of the enemy

399 Guards TSAP arrived and was available to 11 Guards tank corps in Nazviska. At 7 hours it engaged a fortified position in the section of 27 [MSBr] with the task allowing the breakthrough of the tanks of enemy from the direction of [zhivachuv] to [Nazviska], [Gerasimuv].

At 12:00 of 20.4.44 and after an artillery preparation, 7 enemy tanks went into attack at the positions of 27 [MSBr] and rifle regiments.

Batteries opened fire from a distance of 1400-1500m.

After the first few shots several enemy tanks caught fire. The rest, despite the fire of self-propelled units, which caused losses, approached the batteries and tried to outflank the positions of the regiment.

10 enemy tanks abandoned the left flank and started to go around (encircle) battery position. A backup battery was moved at 9:00 PM to destroy the threat, 3 enemy tanks were hit after first shots. The others quickly retreated (hided).

The regiment conducted a heated battle for 7 hours, with enemy tanks and infantry performing attacks. As a results of the attack (counter attack – zakhlebnulas-), enemy was stopped at the boundary of highway between Zhivachuv and Nazviska.

Losses of the enemy: 13 tanks (6 burnt and 7 hit) and 100 soldiers/officers.

Heavy tank [yulki] and self-propelled units, covered by infantry and medium tanks, inflicted significant losses to the enemy in four days of combat, after hitting and destroying 85 enemy tanks.

II. The combat employment of official IS-122 regiments and ISU-152 self-propelled artillery regiments

Passability, armor protection, mobility and constant readiness for opening fire make possible for self-propelled units to accompany tank and infantry units and provide constant and effective support with powerful fire.

IS-122 and ISU-152 open direct fire from 2000 m. Effective fire is achieved from 1500m.

Tanks conduct fire from the stoppages, from those opened, [poluzakrytykh] also on the possibility of sheltered firing positions. Tanks and self-propelled units follow the battle formations of medium tanks or infantry from one position to another, combining fire and maneuver, in this case they are not torn off from the battle formations. The delay of tanks and ISU interfere with their battlefield surveillance and knowledge of combat situation, which leads to delayed pening fire. In all forms of battle, the flanks of heavy tank subdivisions and parts must be covered by medium tanks or infantry with artillery support.

Furthermore, each heavy tank and ISU must have direct cover from the sub-machine gunners.

The skillful use of terrain increases the effectiveness of weapon, decreases the losses and facilitates surprise fire attack on the enemy. Area relief, upper layer of soil and passability have a significant influence on the mobility and a battle of heavy tanks and SU. Swamps, wide deep streams and creeks, wet meadows are the heavily passable obstacles; therefore it is especially important to identify them timely.

Terrain and battlefield reconnaissance must begin from the moment of obtaining the operations order and it must not cease during entire battle. The tasks of terrain reconnaissance is the establishment of the passability of the terrain and roads, the presence of bridges and their load capacity, establishment of the possibility of the concealed rapprochement with the enemy, selection of the footholds and shelters. In the phase of combat the reconnaissance should mainly ensure the surprise attacks on enemy tanks, refine objectives and targets for the fire of tanks and ISU.

Thorough battlefield surveillance is necessary. In the regiment observe the staff officers from the observation points and connection ([PNS]), with Np of the commander of formation, to whom is attached the regiment. The commanders of vehicles and the commanders of subdivisions observe from the combat vehicles or out of the vehicle, leaving (creeping out) forward. The results of observation from the battlefield immediately must be transferred to regiment-commander for radio or to connected.

The connection of regiment-commander with the company commanders (batteries) is achieved by radio and also by rocket

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