[烛光生存狂]-巴巴罗萨行动中的T-34和KV-1

T-34/76 and KV-1 in Barbarossa

By Steve "Mad Russian" Overton

"The new KV and T-34 tanks were an impressive addition to the strength of the new formations, but even here there were problems. Due to the incompetent leadership of Marshal K. Kulik, ammunition production for the 76.2mm tank guns had been delayed and only about 12 per cent of the rounds required were available when war broke out. Most T-34 tanks went into action without any amour piercing shells, only high-explosive, while many tanks did not have even a full load of ammunition."

"Besides the technical problems with the tanks themselves, the mechanized corps were far from ready. The only corps to have seen extensive maneuvers was 4th Mechanized Corps, which conducted a special series of exercises from August to October 1940 to examine the new corps organization and tactics.

In April 1941, one of the experienced divisions, the 10th, was transferred to form the core of the new 15th Mechanized Corps, and a new division, the 32nd, had to be created. So many officers had been swept away by the purges that the corps only had between 45 and 55 per cent of it's complement.

The Red Army was so desperate for corps commanders that the roster included N.V. Feklenko with the 19th , who had been a complete failure as a rifle corps commander at Khalkin Gal, and I.N. Khabarove with the 17th who had been court-marshaled for his performance in Finland in 1940. The new corps commanders were generally younger and much less experienced than their German counterparts

The situation was even worse with non-commissioned officers; only between 19 and 36 per cent were available across all ranks. The T-34 was so new that many tank crews received their first glimpse of it only days before the wars outbreak. About a quarter of the troops came with the spring draft and no military training whatsoever. Most commanders felt lucky to have T-34 drivers with three to five hours of instruction."

"The outbreak of the war caught the Soviet tank forces in a sorry state. The Mechanized Corps were in the process of reforming and reequipping. Many of the older BT�s and T-26's were completely worn out and there was little chance to repair or rebuild them. Small dribbles of the new T-34's and KV's were arriving, but transition to them was complicated and slow.

The new tank divisions were each supposed to be equipped with 210 T-34's but on 22 June 1941 when the Germans invaded, there were only 967 T-34's in all of the western military districts and only a few of them had trained crews. Of the 160 tanks in Maj. Gen. N. Feklenko's 19th Mechanized Corps, only two were T-34's. Most other units were in similar straits but a few were better off. Maj. Gen. D. Riabyshev's 8th Mechanized Corps in Lvov had 600 tanks including 170 KV's and T-34's; Maj. Gen. I.I. Karpezo's 15th Mechanized Corps had 133 T-34's and KV's.

Soon after the invasion, these units were engaged in furious combat around Brody and Dubno in what proved to be the greatest single tank clash of the opening phase of the war. By 30 July, the Soviet units had been decimated, but had dealt opposing Wehrmacht tank units severe losses. May of the Soviet losses came when older BT's and T-26's had to be abandoned for lack of parts and fuel."

In spite of the exceptional performances of the KV tanks on many individual occasions, the overall impact of the KV tanks on the 1941 fighting was negligible. Their technical superiority could not overcome the overwhelming tactical and operational shortcomings of the Red Army in the summer of 1941.

Commanders singled out several reasons for the problems with the KV. The most serious was the general lack of training for the crews.

A report from Ukraine on 8 July noted: "There were exceptionally great losses of KV-2 tanks in the 41st Tank Division. Of the 31 tanks available to the division on 6 July 1941 only nine remain. The enemy knocked out five, 12 were blown up by their own crews, and five were sent for major repairs. The heavy losses of the KV tanks are attributable primarily to the poor technical training of the crews, by their poor knowledge of the tank systems, as well as by an absence of spare parts. When the crews were unable to eliminate malfunctions on stalled KV tanks, there were many occasions when they had to blow them up."

The relative novelty of the tank meant that few crews could carry out anything more than minor maintenance. After being subjected to long road marches particularly in the Ukraine, the tanks soon required significant maintenance at a time when their were neither the skilled crews nor spare parts to carry them out. For example, the commander of the relatively well equipped 8th Mechanized Corps, Gen. Lt. D.I. Ryabyshev reported: From 22-26 June 1941, we carried out movements much beyond normal forced marches without being able to observe the elementary prescribed requirements for maintaining equipment and resting personnel.

The equipment arrived at the battlefield after having covered distances of 500 km. As a result of this, 40 to 50 per cent of the tanks were broken down for technical reasons�and abandoned on the routes of march of the division. As the consequence of such rapid marches, the remaining tanks were technically unprepared for combat.The 37th Tank Division covered 1500 km in less than two weeks, suffering mechanical breakdowns. At the time, the average service life for new Soviet tanks was about 1000-15000 km before factory rebuilding was necessary.

The 10th Tank Division (15th Mechanized Corps) had to endure fruitless forced marches trying to catch the rapidly moving panzer columns. The 10th Tank Division lost 56 of its 63 KV's in fighting through early August, of which 11 were knocked out in combat, 11 went missing in action, and 34 were abandoned or scuttled due to breakdowns.

It appears that this pattern occurred in most other units judging from surviving records. For example, the 8th Tank Division lost 43 of their 50 KV's: 13 in combat, two which became stuck in swamps and 28 which were abandoned or destroyed by their crews due to mechanical breakdowns.

The KV suffered a significantly higher rate of loss due to mechanical problems than other new tanks such as the T-34, according to available records. One of the main problems was the clutch and powertrains. A 1941 field report complained that �the impact of projectiles jams the turret race and the armoured vision ports; the diesel engine has little reserve power leading to the motor becoming overworked, and the master clutch and steering often breakdown.

A German training course at Wunsdorf in early 1942 summarized the Wehrmacht assessment of captured KVs which largely concurred with the view of Russian commanders: "Mechanically, this tank is a poor job. Gears can only be shifted and engaged at the halt, so the maximum speed of 35 km/hr is an illusion. The clutch is too lightly constructed. Almost all abandoned tanks had clutch problems."

The combat utility of the KV was also undermined by several other factors, especially poor crew layout and poor vision devices. The turret was manned by three men as on German tanks, but their functions were different. The commander sat on the right side of the gun and doubled as the loader. The third turret crewman was intended to man the rear turret MG.

The vehicle hatch was located over the machine gunner, not the commander, so that the tank commander was not able to ride with his head outside the tank surveying the terrain as was the German practice. Furthermore, Soviet vision devices were poor: the armoured glass in the driver's visor was sub-standard, being full of air bubbles.

The German assessment was that: "Facilities for observation are worse than in our tanks. The driver's vision is incredibly bad." The designers had recognized this problem as was evident in the KV-3 and Obiekt 220 design, but it was realised too l

战斗中的T-34――科京

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1940年秋，红军接收了第一批T-34坦克。倒霉的是，两年前解散机械化军的行为严重得影响了部队的战术训练。

众所周知，苏联红军最高军事委员会于1939年11月21日下令解散红军全部的4个机械化军， .并决定组建坦克旅和机械化师来取代它们。不到一年后，苏联国防人民委员会又下了一道完全相反的命令――重新组建9个机械化军。最后，到了1941年的二三月间，部署20个机械化军的工作开始了。

不幸的是，红军既没有足够有经验的人员也没有足够的装备，来把这计划变为现实。虽然如此，到战争爆发前红军仍然努力做到了以下几点：部署了几个军，其余的被放放弃了，给坦克部队配备了辅助部队等。因此，到伟大卫国战争爆发的前夜，苏军已拥有了9个从1940年夏季开始组建的较有战斗力的机械化军。. 但是它们在组织上和战术训练的某些方面还是亟待加强的。.最糟的是，为了节省宝贵的发动机摩托小时，乘员们不得不使用老式装备进行训练。新式的T-34都被储藏在仓库里了。用T-26坦克来训练T-34的驾驶员和用BT-2训练BT-7的乘员完全是两码事。

大家可以设想，这样做的后果是T-34的乘员并没有完全熟悉这种威力强大的武器。乘员们对坦克的机械结构极其缺乏了解。这就是为什么在战争的头几个月，有大量的T-34和KV坦克仅仅因为机械故障就被丢弃了的原因之一。

对于战争初期红军到底拥有多少辆T-34，现在存在着多种争论。 1225 T-34 tanks. 我们最近发现的信息表明：截至1941年6月22日，工厂一共生产了1225辆T-34。这种说法也不十分精确。. 这个数字是从1940年开始计算的，当年了生产115辆，1941年的头6个月生产1110辆。但这个计划的截止日期是6月30日，而不是22日。苏军与1940年接收了97辆，从1941年元月到1941年6月22日接收了1129辆。这个数字是1226辆。这点儿误差已经是能够让人们接受了的。

究竟有多少T-34在边境地域部队服役也是有争论的。 .最近的结果是967辆。尽管如此，到底有多少辆某种型号的坦克参加了6月22日的战斗谁也不知道。部队所有的坦克数目是于每个月的第一天上报的。我们所有的数据也都是由这些报告里整理得来的。

截至1941年6月1日，西部的几个军区（列宁格勒军区、波罗的海特别军区、西部特别军区、基辅特别军区和奥德萨特别军区）部队总共拥有832辆T-34。还有68辆在几个后方的军区（莫斯科军区、哈尔科夫军区和奥廖尔军区）。 967和832差了135辆坦克（一说138辆），这些坦克可能于6月间被送往西部军区的部队了。

由于极度缺乏资料，现在我们已经不能确认那些机械化军到底有多少辆T-34了。西南方面军是在基辅特别军区的基础上组建的。我们现在仍可以想象，西南方面军坦克部队的指挥员于1941年6月1日完成报告时的情景。

波罗的海特别军区有2个机械化军――第3机械化军和第12机械化军。只有第3机械化军拥有T-34。, 到1940年1月1日，第3机械化军已装备了50辆。按照计划，它还应该再装备103辆。我们现在仍然不清楚到22日，它总共装备了多少辆T-34。列宁格勒军区的2个机械化军――第1军和第10军没有装备T-34。列宁格勒坦的克训练中心有8辆。

因此，我们无法确定战争爆发前夜，在西部的军区到底装备了多少辆T-34。 967辆可能最接近真实的数字。战争开始时，西部边境军区部队总共有19个机械化军，装备了10394辆各式坦克（一说11000辆）。考虑到一些步兵、骑兵部队装备的一些坦克和一些独立的坦克部队，西部边境军区总共有12782辆坦克（截至6月1日）。T-34的数量只有总数的7.5%。

1941年6月22日，德国及其盟国侵苏部队总共装备了3899辆各式坦克和突击炮（包括最高统帅部预备队的第2和第5装甲师的在内）。这3899辆坦克和突击炮中，只有1404辆3号和4号。这样对于德国人来说，红军装备的967辆T-34和504辆KV坦克将是一支极为可怕的力量。.

让人叹息的是，苏联红军未能有效的利用这支力量。糟糕的部署、人员和装备的缺乏、差劲的训练和编制的不足极大的降低了苏联机械化军的战斗力。.在漫长的行军过程中（机械化军的配属位置离边境太远），很多老式坦克和新式的T-34、KV 由于机械故障，掉队了。缺乏经验的驾驶员经常使变速箱和摩擦式离合器遭到损坏。. 很多故障无法就地排除，而部队装备的工程保障车辆又太少。机械化军装备的拖拉机和44%的卡车被用做炮兵的牵引车。甚至即使偶然遇到了一些拖拉机，它们也没有足够的功率来拖曳T-34和KV坦克。

. 车里雅宾斯克生产的“斯大林-60”和“斯大林-65”4吨农用拖拉机被红军坦克部队用来当拖车。. 它们被用来拖曳T-26和BT还是不错的，但要它们来牵引26吨T-34可是太强人所难了。.至少需要2辆乃至3辆拖拉机才能拖得动T-34，这还是在理想的情况下。一大半T-34装备在基辅特别军区，可是德军的主攻方向却是西部特别军区。

不管怎样，最初坦克战在西南前线的Rovno-Lutks-Brody三角地带爆发了。这一系列战斗仍稀有文献记载。

6月24日，在罗夫诺方向，德军克莱斯特装甲集群（799辆坦克）在苏军第5集团军和第6集团军的结合部冲开了一个50公里宽的口子。T对于这次突破，西南方面军的基层部队开始滋生出恐惧的情绪。为了制止恐惧的蔓延打挎敌人，西南方面军的第8、第9、第15和第19机械化军于6月26日-29日，对德军的侧翼发动了反击。

第9机械化军（军长K・K・罗科索夫斯基少将）和第19机械化军（军长N・V・费克伦科将军）在德国空军的持续空袭下完成了200公里的行军，抵达了卢斯克东部，准备从北面进攻杜波瑙。第8机械化军（军长D・I・累布申少将）和第15机械化军（军长I・I・卡普佐少将）作好了从南面和西南面进攻杜波瑙的准备。这4个军在战争刚开始时分别装备了286、279、858和733辆坦克。这样，进攻部队总共有2156辆各式坦克！其中有181辆T-34和140辆KV坦克。但遗憾的是，至少有50%的坦克由于种种原因没有参加战斗：一些坦克在出发时就出故障了；一些在行军途中因为机械故障和空袭被抛弃了；还有一些没能及时赶到战场：例如，第8机械化军的第7摩托化师在进攻开始时还在行军。这样，能够用于进攻发坦克不到1000辆：700辆从南边进攻，300辆从北边进攻。绝大部分的T-34和KV都在从北边进攻的第9和第19机械化军里。

苏军的反击于26号开始。德军第一装甲集群转为防御势态。主攻方向是德军的48装甲军，它的第11装甲师几乎全军覆没。但是由于缺乏通讯联络设备、部队之间协调不足、高级指挥员能力低下，苏军未能扩大战果，将德军第48装甲军包围全歼。However, we

以下是第19机械化军43师勘测营营长V・A・阿克普夫的回忆：由于无线电联络设备的缺乏，导致高级指挥员的命令迟迟不能传达到基层部队。

前线部队也不能把千变万化的战场情况及时反映给指挥部。举个例子，直到26日，我们师还在攻击德军第11装甲师的右翼，击溃了它的一个坦克团并向杜波瑙前进。我们根本不知道D・I・累布申少将的第8机械化军已经成功的从南面向我们靠拢。第2天，同样的情况又发生了。苏军的3个军:第36步兵军、第8和第19机械化军同时投入了杜波瑙方向的进攻。我们的近邻――第69步兵师也和我们师一起向杜波瑙进发。可是谁都不知道，由I・V・瓦西列夫上校指挥的第8机械化军的快速集群已经冲进了杜波瑙。（瓦西列夫的战斗在《莫斯科保卫战》中的份量很大）尽管出了这么多岔子，6月26日-27日，苏军坦克在南北两翼仍然突入了德军48装甲军达30公里。

.由于各部之间通讯和情报交换的缺乏，苏军没有能够取得最后胜利，也没有在波第和杜波瑙之间合围第48装甲军。在德国军队看来，这个包围圈是差点就完成了的。6月26日月，苏军向杜波瑙方向追击德军，德军第11装甲师溃不成军，陷入极大的恐慌中。红军俘虏了数百个德国俘虏，缴获了大批坦克、装甲车和100辆被丢弃的完好的摩托车。接近杜波瑙已是午夜十分，第86坦克团的坦克手们发现在他们的队伍后面跟着8辆德军坦克。德国坦克兵很可能把他们当成了自己人。苏联坦克手命令德国坦克乘员站在他们的坦克周围。俘虏们争先恐后的企图证明自己不是纳粹党员。在斯大林格勒战役和库尔斯克战役以后，德国军队中才大规模的出现了类似的沮丧恐慌的情绪。在西南方面军发动反击5天后，德国人开始感到沉重的压力。德国陆军总参谋长F・哈尔德上将在6月29日的日记中写到：“俄国人的第8机械化军深深得突破了第1装甲集群的右翼，并向第11装甲师的后方实施包抄。俄国人的突破在我军位于波第和杜波瑙附近的后方引起了极大的混乱。敌人从西南方威胁了杜波瑙。那个地方囤积了大量弹药，一旦丢失，后果不堪设想。”

到1941年9月4日，德军第一装甲集群已经损失了408辆坦克，其中186辆无法修复。如果A・A・弗拉索夫少将的第4机械化军（装备313辆T-34和101辆KV）能够参加战斗，那么德军遭受的损失无疑还会更大。可惜但是这个军正在南部的地域和德军第6集团军战斗。当然苏军的损失也是极为严重的。战斗爆发3天后，全部4个机械化军的坦克消耗得所剩无几了。

从6月22日到7月9日，苏军总共损失了11712辆坦克，包括机会全部的T-34。因为苏军一直在不停的后撤，所以的坦克都无法回收。

由于损失巨大，指挥困难，机械化军再次被撤消。所有的坦克部队被分割成了小的旅、团和营。

Brigades of different organization were participating in Battle for Moscow. 有几个编制不同的坦克旅参加了莫斯科保卫战。如有团编制的第8坦克旅，装备22辆T-34、7辆KV和32辆轻型坦克。第4坦克旅（1941年11月11日改称第1近卫坦克旅）于1941年9月在斯大林格勒组建。该旅直接指挥坦克营，装备49辆坦克（包括16辆斯大林格勒拖拉机厂生产的T-34）。第4坦克旅在M・E・卡图科夫上校的指挥下，在姆曾斯克成功的伏击了德第2装甲集团军的先头部队。经过360公里的摩托行军后，该旅又投入了沃洛克拉马斯克方向的战斗。谈到第1近卫坦克旅，我们就不得不提起季米特里

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