[烛光生存狂]-“克劳塞维兹”装甲师

MS# B-350 Report on the Commitment of the Pz Division “Clausewitz”

11 April--21 April 1945

By Major General Unrein

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Report on the Commitment of the Pz Division “Clausewitz”

11 April--21 April 1945

Central Germany

Map used: America map 1:250,000 sheet M 53

I. Preceding Events:

On the one April 1945 I returned from the east and was appointed commander of the “Clausewitz” Pz division. The division was to be activated as soon as possible in the area around the city of SCHLESWIG (in the province of SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN), and the cadre was to be taken from the replacement Brigade of the “Gross Deutschland” division, which was sheltered near Schleswig. On about 5 April OKH altered the orders. Now the division was to be activated in the area of LAUNENBURG, and for this purpose it was subordinated to the 12 Army and the( General Der Pz Truppe Wenck,) which was being concentrated northeast of the HARZ.

The cadres were to be furnished by: the Pz school had PUTLOS, near LUBECK: tanks and armored vehicles. The “Gross Deutschland” Pz replacement Brigade stationed at the troop training grounds GRAFENWOEHR” (in Bavaria) Panzer Jaeger. The 233 Reserve Pz Div in Denmark: Pz grenadiers for two regiments.

The former “Feldhernnhalle” Pz division: two companies with reconnaissance car, and one company was to come from PUTLOS.

The “Blumentritt” Army: Artillery

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I do not remember who was to furnish us with engineers.

The “Blumentritt” Army: supply troops.

The “Blumentritt” Army: antiaircraft guns, when needed.

The “Holstein” panzer division, destroyed in Pomerania in March 1945: division staff and armored Signal Battalion.

Numbers of the regiment were not fixed by the OKH, this was, however, to be done later on.

The division staff, about one half platoon of their radio company, and one half platoon of the telephone company, intended for the armored Signal Battalion, arrived in GUELZOW (at LAUENBURG), after having marched on foot from the area south of STETTIN.

Tanks, assault guns, reconnaissance cars, panzer grenadiers, and engineers arrived in LAUENBURG and in the area north thereof, partly by train, partly on foot.

Level of training:

Officers and men had had a good training, most of them possessed front experience. They had been retrained in the replacement army, after having recovered from their wounds.

The tank crews were excellent and experience, formally they had served at teachers of the armored forces at PUTALOS.

The equipment was very incomplete. The tanks and many of the reconnaissance cars were useless in the field. Owing to their technical deficiencies they had been used at the PUTALOS School only for training purposes. Further we received tanks of type “III”, “IV”, and even “V”.

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The companies were not regularly equipped with the same type of tanks, which cause much trouble when the tanks had to be repaired on the battlefield, or one spare parts had to be brought up.

The tank ammunition, which they brought with them, was scanty.

The motor vehicles were very bad, and only about 20 percent of the authorized strength was reached. The reconnaissance companies had only 50%.

No guns are made available for the artillery.

Signal equipment: the signal Battalion had 25 percent of the authorized equipment, the other branches had nothing.

Food rations and the scanty supplies of ammunition was first of all allotted from Hamburg, but the bringing up was very difficult as the division had no supply troops available.

II. Engagements

On about the 10 or 11 April the transfer of the division to the area hard north of UELZEN was ordered. It was subordinated to the “Blumentritt” army. At the onset at the outset the division was only to be kept in reserve, and should only be sent and cased the British troops broke through our defense line south of UELZEN. At the same time the activating had to be carried on with all means.

The command post of the division was placed in an arbeitsdienst camp at EMMENDORF, south of UELZEN.

Supply services: a.) Food rations: BIENENBEUTTEL, b.) ammunition: HITZACKER west of (DOENITZ).

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Troops arriving by train were unloaded along the railroad LAUENBURG - UELZEN during the hours of darkness.

The situation on the 10 April:

From the southwest British troops carefully felt their way forward supported by tanks However-in the direction on UELZEN. As the army did not consider the troops and along remember the divisions and regiments hard south of UELZEN capable of resisting a strong enemy supported by tanks, and as UELZEN on the other hand, being a road and railroad center, had to be kept, on the 11 April the army or those elements of the Pz division which had already arrived to reinforce the defense south of UELZEN. About 20 tanks, 10 assault guns and a reconnaissance Battalion with about 70 to 80 reconnaissance cars were incorporated into the troops sent in the south of UELZEN.

The commander of the “Clausewitz” Pz division took over the command of the sector.

(See 1 overlay)

On the 12 April strong British forces launched an attack on UELZEN from the south. The attack was repelled and the British suffered losses. (PWs stated that the attacking British armored division had its first losses since the Battle of XANTEN). The British, therefore, stopped further attacks on UELZEN, and continued their thrust about 10 km west of UELZEN in the direction of BIENENBEUTTEL. I did know the exact dates.

On the 13 April tanks and reconnaissance car battalion or extracted from the defensive front, and the Pz division gave

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over the command to the local infantry Division in command. Two Pz Gren Battalions, which had been sent in on the April 12th, and 10 assault guns remain at the front and the command of the infantry division.

On the 12 April the staff of the 39 panzer corps (under General der Pz Truppe Decker) arrived the command post of the “Clausewitz” panzer division. The division had to motorized divisions, with which were being activated, (among them the “Schlageter” motorized division consisting of men from the Arbeitsdienst) were to be subordinated to the corps. The 39 Corps was placed immediately subordinated to the OKW.

The two motorized divisions mentioned above did not join the corps and will consequently not be mentioned in this report.

From the OKW the 39 Pz corps received the following motion signed by Hitler:

From the area around UELZEN the Pz corps was soon as possible thrust to the south past HELMSTEDT deep in the flank and rear of the American group of armies, further it will try to establish communication with the 11 Army, fighting in the HARZ. In case record rate movements of the American group of armies from the ELBE to the West should be ascertain, the PZ Corps will immediately turn to the West in the direction of the are you H R district, regardless of such movements.

The panzer corps submitted the sense of the order to the panzer division “Clausewitz”, stating our that for the time being it only needed to establish communication with the 11 Army in the HARZ after having crossed the WESER-ELBE canal.

Our reconnaissance showed the following: The

LANGENBRUECKE-

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DUELZENBURG was only thinly or not all occupied. If certain gap in reconnaissance was observed with the enemy. And it appeared that the line of demarcation between the British and American army groups was here, as later confirmed.

The division resolved (the Pz corps agreed) to push past the line WITTINGEN-SALZWEDEL in the direction of FALLERSLEBEN, the ELM, and the HARZ -but not until the activating would be completed on about the 17th or April 18th.

The OKW considered this to light, and ordered the available forces of the division to march off immediately without waiting for the completion of the activating.

The British forces south of UELZEN (the American forces at the line of demarcation as far as SAL

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