[烛光生存狂]-俄制装甲车辆在巷战中的弱点—

In December 1994, the Russian Army entered the breakaway Republic of Chechnya and attempted to seize the Chechen capital of Grozny from the march. After this attempt failed, the Russian Army spent two months in deliberate house-to-house fighting before finally capturing the city.(1) The dispirited Russian conscript force was badly mauled by the more mature, dedicated Chechen force, and the war drags on to this day. During the first month of the conflict, Russian forces wrote off 225 armored vehicles as nonrepairable battle losses. This represents 10.23% of the armored vehicles initially committed to the campaign. The Russians evacuated some of these 225 hulls to the Kubinka test range for analysis. General-Lieutenant A. Galkin, the head of the Armor Directorate, held a conference on their findings on 20 February 1995. The Minister of Defense attended the conference.(2) The results of the conference convinced the Russian Minister of Defense to stop procuring tanks with gas-turbine engines.(3) Further, the analysis disclosed Chechen anti-armor tactics and the vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles in urban combat.

1994年12月，俄国陆军进入了分裂的车臣共和国，并且从来年3月开始尝试占领车臣首府格罗兹尼。在初战失利之后，俄国军队花了两个月的时间进行谨慎的逐屋巷战，最终夺取了这座城市（1）。士气低落的俄国志愿兵很难与更加老练的车臣武装想对抗。因此战争一直拖延到了现在。在冲突的第一个月，俄国军队报告有225辆装甲车辆遭到“不可修复”的战损。这表示参战的10.23％的装甲车辆损失。俄国人将一些被摧毁的装甲车辆的车体运到库宾卡试验场进行分析。1995年2月20日举行了一次关于试验结果的会议。与会者包括装甲部队司令A.高尔欣中将和国防部长（2）。会上后者决定暂停装备使用燃气轮机动力的坦克（3）。更进一步说，这个分析报告也披露了车臣反坦克战术和俄国装甲车辆在城市战中的脆弱性。

Chechen Anti-armor Techniques

车臣反装甲战术

The Chechen forces are armed with Soviet and Russian-produced weapons, and most Chechen fighters served in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Chechen lower-level combat group consists of 15 to 20 personnel subdivided into three or four-man fighting cells. These cells consist of an antitank gunner (normally armed with the RPG-7 or RPG-18 shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher), a machine gunner and a sniper.(4) Additional personnel serve as ammunition bearers and assistant gunners.

车臣人使用的是苏联和俄罗斯制造的武器,大部分车臣战士都曾在苏联军队服役.车臣低强度战斗群由15-20人组成,再细分为三或四人的战斗小组,这些小组由一名反坦克手(通常装备RPG-7或RPG-18肩抗式反坦克火箭筒),一名机枪手和一名狙击手（4）.额外的人员则作为弹药手和副机枪手.

Chechen combat groups would deploy these cells as anti-armor hunter-killer teams. The sniper and machine gunner would pin down the supporting infantry while the antitank gunner would engage the armored target. Teams deploy at ground level, in second and third stories, and in basements. Normally five or six hunter-killer teams simultaneously attack a single armored vehicle. Kill shots are generally made against the top, rear and sides of vehicles. Chechens also drop bottles filled with gasoline or jellied fuel on top of vehicles.(5) The Chechen hunter-killer teams try to trap vehicle columns in city streets where destruction of the first and last vehicles will trap the column and allow its total destruction.

车臣战斗群通常是这样部署这些被称为反装甲猎杀组.狙击手和机枪手负责在反坦克手和装甲目标交战时压制敌方的支援步兵.小组被部署在地面,建筑的2/3楼和地下室.通常是5或6个猎杀小组同时攻击一个装甲目标.一般攻击车辆的顶部后部和侧面.车臣人也使用装满了汽油或胶状燃料从顶部攻击车辆（5）.车臣猎杀小组在城市巷战中伏击车队一般是先攻击首尾两车,之后全部击毁.

The elevation and depression of the Russian main tank guns are incapable of dealing with hunter-killer teams fighting from basements and second or third-story positions and the simultaneous attack from five or six teams negate the effectiveness of the tank's machine guns. The Russians attached ZSU 23-4 and 2S6 track-mounted antiaircraft guns to armored columns to respond to these difficult-to-engage hunter-killer teams.(6)

俄国主战坦克的主炮的俯仰角度有限无法打击位于地下室或2/3楼的猎杀小组．此外，坦克上的机枪也无法同时应付5到6个猎杀小组的同步进攻．因此，俄国人把ZSU 23-4自行高炮和2S6一起编入了装甲车队中来应付这些难缠的家伙（6）．

Initial Russian vehicle losses were due to a combination of inappropriate tactics, underestimation of the opposing force, and a lack of combat readiness. The Russians moved into Grozny without encircling it and sealing it off from reinforcements. They planned to take the city from the march without dismounting. Due to shortages in personnel, the Russian columns consisted of composite units and most personnel carriers traveled with few or no dismounts. These initial columns were decimated.

　　不适当的战术协同，低估对手实力以及缺乏战斗准备．这些都是造成俄国装甲车辆损失的原因.俄国人没有包围和切断叛军向格罗兹尼增援的路线.他们计划是快速的占领这座城市.因为缺人,临时拼凑的部队和大部分的人员输送车都没有步兵提供掩护.这些部队后来都遭遇大大量的伤亡.

As the Russians regrouped, they brought in more infantry and began a systematic advance through the city, house by house and block by block. Russian armored vehicle losses dropped off with their change in tactics. Russian infantry moved in front with armored combat vehicles in support or in reserve. Some Russian vehicles were outfitted with a cage of wire mesh mounted some 25-30 centimeters away from the hull armor to defeat the shaped charges of an antitank grenade launcher as well as to protect the vehicle from a Molotov cocktail or bundle of explosives. The Russians began establishing ambushes on approach routes into a selected area and then running vehicles into the area as bait to destroy Chechen hunter-killer teams.(7)

之后俄国人开始整编自己的部队.他们带来了更多的步兵.并且和叛军一幢幢房屋,一个个街区的争夺.有系统的一步步向格罗兹尼进军.装甲战斗车辆的损失也因此开始下降.战斗中步兵在前,装甲战斗车辆为其提供支援或作为预备队.一些俄国车辆开始在把用钢丝固定的铁丝网安装在离车体装甲25-30厘米的地方,增强其应付反坦克火箭,燃烧瓶或者集束手雷的威胁.另外俄国人也开始在前进路线中选择一个地区设伏,然后车辆快速通过这个地区,诱骗和摧毁车臣猎杀小组.(7)

Vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles

俄制装甲车辆的防御弱点

Shoulder-fired antitank weapons and antitank grenades knocked out the bulk of armored vehicles and each destroyed vehicle took an average of three to six lethal hits.(8) Fuel cells and engines are favorite aiming points for Chechen antitank gunners. The following illustrations have a grey area imposed which shows the area where 90% of the lethal hits occurred.(9)

大部分的装甲车辆是由肩扛式反坦克武器和反坦克手雷击毁的.平均每一辆被摧毁的车上都有3到6个弹孔.(8)油箱和发动机是车臣反坦克手们的主要打击目标.下面插图中的灰色部分中分布的弹孔大约占到整个的90%.(9)

The BMD-1 is a personnel carrier assigned to airborne forces. As such, it is lightly armored.

BMD-1是为空降部队装备的人员输送车．因此它的装甲非常的薄．

It was vulnerable to front, rear, flanking and top-down fire. The front portion of the turret is reinforced and, consequently, not vulnerable, but the rear of the turret is.

车体前后部，侧面以及车顶和车底的防护都很脆弱．炮塔正面稍好一些，但炮塔后部还是很脆弱．

There is more armor on the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. However, its top armor is weak, its fuel tanks are within the rear doors and the driver's compartment is vulnerable.

有着稍好一点装甲防护的BMP-2步兵战车．不过，它的顶部装甲非常薄弱．后车门上的内置油箱和车体前部的驾驶室同样是其防御弱点．

The BTR-70 wheeled armored personnel carrier showed many of the same vulnerabilities as the BMD and BMP.

BTR

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