[烛光生存狂]-第8机械化军的反击

Among the many battles that took place during the opening period of the Great Patriotic War, one border-zone engagement in particular, the counteroffensive mounted by forces of the South-Western Front in June of 1941, has received special attention from military professionals and the general reader both within our country and abroad. Many of those who took part in that battle have left detailed accounts of the fighting. I myself have also participated in the counteroffensive, having commanded the 8th Mechanized Corps, comprised of the 7th Motorized and the 12th and 34th Tank Divisions, since its inception in 1940 and through its dissolution in July of 1941. As such, I would like to use this article to add my experiences to existing accounts of the battle as well as to expand on and clarify the role played by my Corps.

In the summer of 1941, the 8th Mechanized Corps, as part of the 26th Army, was based in what was then called the Drogobychskaja sector in the Ukraine. When the war began, the various units making up the Corps were still being formed and rearmed. Technically, the Corps had its full complement of officers and enlisted men and 932 tanks compared with its authorized strength of 1,031 machines. However, only 169 of the Corps’ tanks were modern medium and heavy models such as the T-34. The remaining 763 machines were obsolete models averaging barely 500 kilometers between maintenance checks, and 197 of them were in need of a full factory overhaul. The Corps was also lacking in artillery and anti-tank weapons. Of the 141 guns on hand, 53 were small-caliber 37m and 45mm guns. Anti-aircraft resources were comprised of 4 37mm AA guns and 24 anti-aircraft machine guns. In terms of gun transport, the Corps only possessed a pool of slow moving and worn out tractors.

On June 20, 1941, by order of the staff of the Kiev Special Defense Region, all serviceable tanks in the Corps were fueled and took on combat ammunition, and at dawn on June 22 the Corps was placed on alert. By the end of the day, the Corps advanced to a position 10 kilometers south of Sambor. Only one motorized regiment of the 7th Motor Division did not get its orders in time and was bombed by the enemy, losing a total of 190 men including 120 wounded.

At 2040 hours on June 22, commander of the South-Western Front Colonel General M.P. Kirponos ordered the Corps to advance into the Kurovice-Vinniki sector and place itself under the command of the 6th Army. By 1200 hours the next day some of the tanks have reached their objective. However as the main part of the Corps was approaching its designated positions, commander of the 6th Army Lieutenant General N.I. Muzychenko issued a new set of orders: the Corps was now to take position in the woods southwest of Javorov, and on June 24th to launch an attack together with units of the 6th Rifle Corps with the aim of throwing the enemy back across the border.

Due to this sudden change in the Corps’ mission objectives I was forced to immediately set out towards the advancing columns of the 12th Tank and 7th Motorized Divisions. Turning them around in a new direction required considerable effort. The 34th Tank Division was attended to by the Corps Political Officer, Brigade Commissar N.K. Popel’, and by Battalion Commissar M.A. Oksen. From that time onward, the Corps moved along wooded paths and country back roads under constant threat from enemy aircraft.

At 2200 hours the Corps received yet another set of orders, this time from the Front commander: by the end of June 24, the 8th Mechanized Corps is to deploy near Brody, with the aim of attacking an enemy tank grouping advancing to the north of Dubno on the morning of June 24. I immediately ordered commanders of the 12th and 34th Tank Divisions’ advance guard Colonels P.I. Volkov and N.D. Bolhovitin to turn their units in the direction of L’vov, refuel at the depots in that city, then drive off to Brody, take defensive positions around the town’s suburbs, establish communications with local Red Army units and reconnoiter the enemy positions.

By 2400 hours the main part of the Corps began moving towards its newly assigned positions. The march was conducted under constant air attacks. The roads were clogged with Red Army units and civilian refugees streaming towards the rear, and the resulting traffic jams had slowed the Corps down considerably. Given the rapidly changing battlefield conditions, it was virtually impossible to control the traffic or to establish roadside maintenance facilities.

Around the second half of June 25, the Corps’ units deployed to the northwest of Brody. During the nearly 500 kilometer march, the Corps lost up to half of its older tanks and a substantial portion of its artillery and anti-tank guns to both enemy air attack and mechanical breakdowns. All of the tanks still in service also required varying degrees of maintenance work and were not capable of operating over long distances. Thus, even before the start of the counteroffensive the Corps found itself in a drastically weakened state.

By this time, the enemy’s 1st Tank Group (Panzer Group 1, cmd. von Kleist – Transl.) broke through to Lutsk and Dubno, and threatened to develop an offensive towards Kiev. The battle on the junction of the 5th and 6th Armies was reaching a critical stage. The Front commander decided to seal the German breakthrough with a broad counterattack mounted by six mechanized corps. However, the Front’s intentions and the scale of the counteroffensive were not communicated down to the 8th Mechanized Corps. The Corps’ battle orders spoke only to its own mission objectives. The counterattack was to be mounted through the sector presently held by the 15th Army, which was retreating behind the rivers of Ikva and Styr’ after heavy fighting near the border. The town of Brody was completely unoccupied by either our own or the enemy’s forces. At the time, we had no information about our neighbors to the right or to the left, and no word of any units with which to coordinate our attack. By 2400 hours on June 25 our reconnaissance groups, sent out while the Corps was still on the march, reported that the enemy took defensive positions along the path of the proposed counteroffensive, covering his main axis of advance. Specifically, the enemy positions faced eastwards on the Iskva River and southeastwards on the Syten’ka River, and was engaged along those fronts by the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps. Shortly after this report I made contact with the 212th Division’s commander, Major General S.V. Baranov. He told be that the 15th Mechanized Corps was fighting enemy paratroopers that dropped in the Radzehov sector at the war’s start, and, having destroyed these forces, engaged with a powerful enemy tank group. This tank group forced the 15th Mechanized Corps back on the defensive along a 10-kilometer front. Having ascertained the situation, I began to prepare for an offensive although I did not possess any precise details of the enemy’s strength and composition.

The enemy did not have any prepared positions, and thus we decided not to conduct any preparatory bombardments. I issued the order to attack at dawn of June 26, with the aim of breaking through the enemy defenses and reaching the line of Pljashevka River-Berestechko-Mikolaev by the end of the day. The Corps’ battle order was single-echelon, with artillery support for the attacking forces provided by the Corps’ own guns. The area of attack was a vast plain heavily criss-crossed with forests and gulleys as well as small rivers roughly 5-10 kilometers away from each other. A typical example of these was the Slonovka River, which was up to 30 meters wide and 1.5-2 meters deep, with a 2-kilometer wetland around the shoreline.

The offensive began in the morning but did not develop as was desired. The 12th Tank D

西南方面军的反击

单纯从数量上看，已赶到战场的3个苏联机械化军（第22、15、4）在战争爆发时拥有2272辆坦克，比德国南方集团军群坦克总数还多2倍，然而在调动过程中，这些坦克中相当大的一部分已经抛了锚，缺乏技术保障的苏军只得将他们丢弃。机械化第22军的情况更为严重。正如前面已经介绍过的那样，该军军长孔德卢瑟夫少将在战争爆发后不久就受了重伤，并在6月23日死亡，使机械化第22军的指挥趋于混乱。在其下属的3个师中，实际赶到战场的只有配备旧式坦克的坦克第19师和摩化第215师，装备有31辆KV坦克的坦克第41师由于无法取得联系曾一度“失踪”，而此时则正忙于修理坦克，稍后才能投入战斗。

虽然情况很坏，但在上级的严令下，没有了军长的机械化第22军还是在6月24日下午，以现有的兵力向当面德军的左翼发动进攻。该军所要对付的是德军第3 摩托化军，在其编成内有丘恩少将指挥的德国装甲第14师（近150辆坦克）和汉森少将的装甲13师（也拥有近150辆坦克），此前这2个装甲师正在进攻卢茨克方向的苏军步兵135师的2个团和反坦克炮第1旅的阵地。苏德2个机械化/摩托化军发生了大规模的坦克战。由于没有专用弹药，机械化第22军所属的 31辆KV-2坦克只好按朱可夫建议，使用152毫米混凝土破坏弹向德军射击。

152毫米重磅炮弹的威力果然不俗。经过激战，德国人被苏联坦克暂时阻住，于是便调来第4航空队第5航空军的轰炸机群对苏军狂轰滥炸。在抗击苏联坦克的战斗中，占据制空权的德国空军发挥了巨大作用。到6月 30日，第5航空军所属的3个轰炸航空联队（第51、54、55）就宣称击毁了201辆苏联坦克。而红军方面，虽然西南方面军在战斗前规定由第62、18 混合航空兵师为这支苏军提供空中掩护，但由于联系不上，机械化第22军只能任由德国飞机对他们进行大肆屠杀。

与此同时，德国装甲第13师则向苏军第5集团军的后方迂回，迫使这个集团军撤退。而在进攻中损失惨重的机械化第22军则退至科维尔以东。6月25日，德军装甲第13师占领卢茨克，而摩托化第48军所属的装甲第11师也于当日占领杜布诺。

在红军第5集团军失利的同时，利沃夫方向的红军第6集团军反击的却还比较顺手，特别是该集团军下属的步兵第159师在重创了德军第4军步兵第254师后，几乎打到了国境线，而机械化第4军（红军最强大的一个机械化军）则企图在这个方向发起一次强大的攻击。但第5集团军的撤退和杜布诺的失守，使第6集团军的左翼暴露给了德国人。为了防止被合围，第6集团军也被迫后退。到了6月26日，红军第5、6集团军之间形成了80公里的空隙。克莱斯特指挥下的德国第 1装甲集群正利用这一空隙快速推进。

机械化军反击的失败

此时，堵在这个空隙之间阻挡德国第1装甲集群前进的苏军，除了在此前的战斗中已被严重削弱的卡尔别卓指挥的机械化第15军外（这个军此前在与德国第11 装甲师的战斗中损失惨重），还有刚刚赶到战场的机械化第8军（军长里亚贝舍夫少将）和机械化第9、19军。对于这3个军来说，他们的调动过程简直是灾难。

以机械化第8军为例。在开战时，该军拥有坦克858辆（内有T-34型坦克100辆，KV重型坦克71辆），其实力超过苏联全军中除机械化第4军以外的任何一个军。但该军也是在边境交战中调动距离最远的一个军。从战争开始到现在，机械化第8军在各上级司令部相互矛盾的命令下疲于奔命。它一会儿按第26集团军的命令行军80公里到达桑波尔市以西，一会儿又奉命开到利沃夫以东；而在被划归第6集团军后，该军又根据新上级的指示开进到亚沃罗夫；紧接着，机械化第8军又在西南方面军司令部的直接指挥下，迅速赶往布罗德地区集结。6月25日黄昏，在进至上述进攻出发地后，机械化第8军已经在德国飞机的不断袭挠下行军400多公里，并在这一过程中丢失了约50%的坦克和火炮，剩下的坦克燃料也即将耗尽。军长里亚贝舍夫少将后来在作战报告中写道：“在坦克师通过的地方，到处都丢下数量众多、发生故障的重型坦克”。

机械化第9、19军在调动中的遭遇不比机械化第8军好多少。缺乏运输车辆的机械化第 9军纯粹靠该军军长罗科索夫斯基在战争第一天便大胆的弄走了方面军的全部200辆预备车辆，才得以完成行军。如果考虑到这位曾遭受迫害的将军不久前刚刚从内务人民委员部的监狱里释放出来（在那里，他被打掉了几颗牙齿），我们就不能不承认这个人确实是“胆大包天”。这位后来的苏联元帅在回忆当时的情况时很有些不堪回首的感觉：“在行军中，我痛心地看着我们老式的T-26坦克、BT-5坦克和少量的BT-7坦克。我明白，它们经不住长时间的战斗。更糟糕的是, 就是这样的坦克装备数量也只有编制数的1/3（285辆旧式坦克）。再看看我们坦克师所属的摩托化步兵吧！编制规定的车辆没有。而且由于名义上是摩托化的，所以既没有马车，也没有马。”尽管各军在调动过程中损失巨大、人员极度疲乏、车辆磨损严重，但由于形势紧张，西南方面军司令部不但没有给这些机械化军任何准备时间，反而命令各机械化军必须立刻采取反击行动。按照计划，机械化第9、19军将由卢茨克以东；机械化第 8、15军由布罗迪以北及东北地区；机械化第4军从利沃夫西北，对正在深入的德国装甲部队发动反击。由于在上述各军之间未能取得必要的联系，自然也谈不上什么战术协同,各军在反击中实际上都是在孤军奋战。

在整个作战中，里亚贝舍夫少将指挥的机械化第8军的反击处于特殊重要的地位，它的成败关系到是否能够阻止德国第1装甲集群分割西南方面军的企图。为此，朱可夫在6月23日曾亲自来到这个军的司令部视察，该军军长及参谋人员在德军空袭中表现出来的高昂士气给他不错的印象。该军虽然在行军中丢失了大约一半的坦克，但仍然有大约400辆开到了战场，其中包括30-40辆KV重型坦克。虽然存在种种缺点，但这仍是一支不可轻视的力量。

6月26日晨，机械化第8军在宽约22公里的正面展开，其当面是德军第16装甲师（约140辆坦克）。第16装甲师是一个在原步兵第16师基础上组建的新师，指挥这个装甲师的是在一战中失去左手的独臂将军汉斯·胡贝少将（也有资料称胡贝是在1942年才开始担任该师师长），他是未来的德国第1装甲集团军指挥官，并最终在担任这个职务期间因飞机失事而丧命。此时，通过时刻在空中盘旋的侦察机和地面部队的严密侦察，这个经验丰富的德国装甲部队指挥官已经了解到了红军机械化第8军的意图，并且做好了充分准备。而他的那位几乎没有任何情报来源的对手、红军少将里亚贝舍夫却只能在敌情不明、弹药油料不足的情况下强行发动进攻。而且出于无法解释的理由，他的机械化军还必须把一部分兵力交给旅级政委波别尔指挥，虽然此人非常缺乏指挥大规模作战的能力。

6月26日上午9时，在坦克数量上占优势的苏军机械化第8军发动了冲击，结果却遇上了一条虽然不宽，但两岸都是沼泽的河流。由于匆忙发动进攻的苏军在战斗前没有进行地形侦察，机械化第8军此前并不知道有这么一条河横在面前。但现在战斗已经开始，重新选择进攻出发地域已经不可能了。机械化第8军军长里亚贝舍夫少将只得派出摩托化分队去占领该河北岸，以掩护坦克部队渡河。

时刻掌握着苏军动向的德国人当然没有放过这个有利的机会。配合第 16装甲师行动的步兵第57师炮兵部队迅速组织起猛烈的火力急袭，呼啸而来的一排排重炮炮弹摧毁了大量正在渡河的苏联坦克。与此同时，苏军的先头坦克部队与德装甲16师第6坦克连发生了遭遇战，战斗规模随即扩大。德国的炮手们惊奇地看着苏军新式的T-34坦克在被他们打得满是弹痕后仍然满不在乎的前进。在这次战斗中，苏军宣称击毁和缴获了8辆德国坦克，消灭了2个德国摩托化营，向前推进了4-12公里。

但是由于经过长时间行军，苏军坦克的油料已经消耗得差不多了。在空中，德军第4航空队对几乎没有得到一架苏联飞机支援的机械化8军的袭击持续不断，使该军所属部队，特别是右翼的坦克第 12师损失了大量的装备和人员，甚至军长里亚贝舍夫少将本人也在空袭中受了重伤，不得不由副军长接替了他的指挥。

相比之下，机械化第 8军右翼的坦克第34师的攻势则比较顺利。该师凭借KV重型坦克强大的火力和坚固的装甲，不顾一切地突破了德军的阵地，进而直接威胁到了德国装甲部队的通道。面对危急形势，德国人迅速做出了反应。他们将空军配属的“赫尔曼·戈林”团第1摩托化重型高射炮营的88毫米口径高射炮集中在苏军必经的桥梁附近，击毁了许多没有步兵掩护、彼此缺乏战术协同的苏联坦克（德方宣称摧毁了30-40辆），从而阻止了苏军坦克第34师的攻势。

当天夜里，进攻严重受挫，损失惨重的红军机械化第8军被迫退出了战斗。6月27日晨4时，西南方面军允许其全面撤退的命令下达到了该军。可是过了不到3个小时，已经在撤退过程中的机械化第8军又接到了方面军重新发动进攻的命令，紧接着方面军军事委员瓦舒金本人来到该军司令部。这个脾气暴躁的军事委员气势汹汹的告诉已经身负重伤的军长里亚贝舍夫少将，如果不执行进攻命令，就要枪决他。可极具讽刺意味的是，就在这个时候，方面军司令部已经撤销了瓦舒金带来的这道命令，而他本人和无法与上级取得通讯联络的机械化第8军都不知道这个新情况。

于是按照这道事实上已经失效的命令，机械化第8军将撤退的后队改为前队，以坦克第12师的25辆坦克为前导，坦克第34师及坦克第12师一部共计180辆坦克紧随其后，靠着最后一点燃料发动了新的攻势。长长的红军坦克纵队踏上了绝望的征程。

尽管德军第48装甲军的侦察机发现苏军机械化军的重新集结和进攻，可是胡贝第16装甲师的阵地还是在对手200余辆坦克（包括大量重型坦克）的猛烈冲击下被突入了30多公里，与其友邻的装甲11师的补给线有被切断的危险，而德国步兵第57师则遭到了重创。但是机械化第8军的反击毕竟是孤立无援：在该军的侧翼，红军其他机械化军的反击实际上已经失败了，他们的残余兵力正在握有制空权的德军追击下后撤。因此，机械化第8军上述的进展反而使其陷入孤军深入、即将被合围的危险之中。

危险很快就变成了现实。德军装甲第16师在装甲第 11师部分兵力和由第14<

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