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US Army in World War II

Introduction and Organization

by Rich Anderson

Introduction

导言

The US Army of World War II was created from a tiny antebellum army in the space of three years. On 30 June 1939 the Regular Army numbered 187,893 men, including 22,387 in the Army Air Corps. On the same date the National Guard totaled 199,491 men. The major combat units included nine infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, a mechanized cavalry (armor) brigade in the Regular Army and eighteen infantry divisions in the National Guard. Modern equipment was for the most part nonexistent and training in the National Guard units varied from fair to poor.

美国陆军从战前那支微型的军队重建花费了三年时间。1939年6月30日，陆军现役军人总数187893人（其中陆军航空队22387人），国民警卫队199491人。主要的作战部队包括陆军的9个步兵师、2个骑兵师、1个机械化骑兵（装甲）旅和国民警卫队的18个步兵师。国民警卫队装备陈旧落后，训练水平也参差不齐。

The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 led to a gradual expansion of the Army. On 27 August 1940, Congress authorized the induction of the National Guard into Federal service. On 16 September 1940 the first peacetime draft in United States history was passed by Congress. However, the draftees were inducted for only one year. Fortunately, on 7 August 1941, by a margin of a single vote, Congress approved an indefinite extension of service for the Guard, draftees, and Reserve officers. Four months later to the day, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

1939年9月，欧洲战争爆发导致美国陆军的逐步扩军。1940年8月27日，国会批准把国民警卫队纳入联邦现役。1940年9月16日，国会通过了美国历史上第一个和平时期征兵法案，但是兵役期只有一年。幸运的是，1941年8月7日，国会投票以简单多数通过了不定期延长国民警卫队队员、被征士兵和预备军官服役期。四个月后，日本偷袭了珍珠港。

On 7 December 1941 the Army consisted of 1,685,403 men (including 275,889 in the Air Corps) in 29 infantry, five armor, and two cavalry divisions. While this 435 percent increase was a magnificent achievement, shortages of equipment and trained personnel were still serious. Over the following three and a half years the Army expanded a further 492 percent, to 8,291,336 men in 89 divisions: sixty-six infantry, five airborne, sixteen armored, one cavalry, and one mountain infantry.

1941年12月7日，美国陆军总兵力1685403人（其中陆军航空队275889人）。共编有29个步兵师、5个装甲师和2个骑兵师。增长到原有规模的435%是一个显著的成就，但是缺乏装备和训练有素的人员的问题仍旧十分严重。在这之后的三年半的时间里，陆军又增长到了1941年12月7日的492%，达到了8291336人，共编有89个师：66个步兵师、5个空降师、16个装甲师、1个骑兵师和1个山地师。

On 16 December 1944, forty-three divisions were deployed in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), including two airborne, ten armored and thirty-one infantry. Sixteen more divisions were preparing to join them. One armored division was on its way to the front. One airborne, one armored, and two infantry divisions were in England awaiting shipment to France. One airborne, three armored, and seven infantry divisions were in the final stages of training in the United States or were in route to Europe, but would not be deployed as complete units on the continent prior to the end of 1944.

1944年12月16日，在欧洲一共部署了42个师，包括2个空降师，10个装甲师和31个步兵师。另外，还有超过16个师准备投入欧洲前线：1个装甲师在开往前线的路上；1个空降师、1个装甲师和2个步兵师在英国等待船运到法国。1个空降师、3个装甲师和7个步兵师在美国本土处于训练的最后阶段或者开往欧洲的途中，但都不可能在1944年欧战结束前投入到欧洲大陆。

At the end of the war in Europe there were a total of sixty-one divisions in the ETO: fifteen armored, forty-two infantry, and four airborne (one airborne division, the 13th, did not enter combat). Also, there were seven divisions in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO): one armored, five infantry (including one composed of African-American troops, the 93rd [designated Colored in the segregated Army, and a term that we will utilize without intent of prejudice in this essay]), and the 10th Mountain. There were twenty-one divisions in the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO); one cavalry (dismounted), nineteen infantry (including one that did not enter combat, the 98th, and one that was Colored, the 93rd), and one airborne.

欧战结束时，欧洲战区总共投入了61个师：15个装甲师、42个步兵师和4个空降师（第13空降师没有投入战斗）。地中海战区总共投入了7个师：1个装甲师、5个步兵师（包括一个由美国裔非洲人组成的第93步兵师）和第10山地师。太平洋战区总共投入了21个师：1个骑兵师（下马作战）19个步兵师（包括没有投入作战的第98步兵师和第93有色人种师）和1个空降师。

Many of the problems associated with the performance of American units in World War II may be directly attributed to this. In general, the US Army was the best equipped and supplied in the war. However, the commonly accepted view that the US Army overwhelmed opponents by sheer numbers is not quite correct. US industrial expansion did provide a steady source of supply to the combat troops. However, logistical shortages, particularly in regards to tanks and artillery ammunition, and personnel replacements were a problem for American forces throughout the war.

美国部队作战表现中的很多问题都可以直接归咎于一点。一般来说，美国陆军装备精良，后勤补给是所有参战国中最好的。可是，一般公认的观点，即美国陆军纯粹依靠数量优势压倒对手是不正确的。美国扩张的工业为作战部队提供了稳定的物资供应。但是战争中后勤短缺，特别是坦克和火炮的弹药，以及兵员补充等问题一直困绕着美国人。

Organization of the Army Ground Forces

The Army Ground Forces (AGF) was created in a major reorganization of the Army General Headquarters on 9 March 1942. AGF became responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of all Army units other than the Air Corps. The first commander of AGF was Major General (later lieutenant general) J. Lesley McNair (General McNair was accidentally killed by U.S. bombs while observing Operation COBRA on 25 July 1944). General McNair was the final arbiter on Army organization. He campaigned tirelessly to reduce overhead in U.S. divisions, insisting on as much streamlining as possible. There were two reasons for this. First, shipping space was at a premium for not only combat but also support units, and all supply items had to be shipped from the United States over great distances to foreign ports. Second, NcNair and other planners realized that the U.S. manpower pool was not inexhaustible. Industry and farming in the United States, and the massive expansion of the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army Air Corps, and Merchant Marine all absorbed vast numbers of men. The 213-division Army envisaged by the Victory Program of 25 September 1941 was never even close to being achieved; it proved to be difficult enough to man the 89 divisions eventually fielded.

Pooling

An adjunct to General McNair's efforts to streamline the army was his effort to pool all non-divisional combat assets into homogeneous battalion-size units. Pooled units were to be held by corps or armies and were to be attached to divisions as needed. Field artillery, engineers, tanks, tank destroyers, antiaircraft artillery, and infantry units were all part of the pool. To facilitate pooling, in February 1943 all of the existing field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and engineer combat regiments were broken up into separate battalions. The regimental headquarters were then utilized to form group headquarters. The group headquarters was intended to provide command and control for manageable aggregations of the large number of pool units.

A Note on Terminology

The convention utilized by the U.S. Army is that the designation of an army is spelt out (First), corps use Roman numerals (XX), divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and platoons all use Arabic numerals (90th), and companies, troops and batteries are lettered.

Corps, Army, and Army Groups

军、集团军和集团军群

Twenty-four corps were activate

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主题: 二战中的美国陆军1606

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US Army in World War II

Armor and Tank Types

by Rich Anderson

Armor

US armored units underwent a considerable number of changes - most of them forced by operational requirements -- during the war. The most significant of these were the reorganization of the armored divisions in 1943 and the modified Tables of Equipment (TE) that were utilized by most tank battalions in Europe during late 1944 and early 1945. The modified TE was put in effect when losses of medium tanks in Europe outpaced the Army's ability to replace them and reduced the number of medium tanks in the battalion from fifty-three to forty-one. All of the light armored divisions and separate tank battalions in Europe in the fall of 1944 were placed on the modified establishment. It is probable that those divisions (8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th) and battalions that arrived in late 1944 retained the original TE, although some separate battalions were temporarily stripped of equipment to provide replacement stocks for the battalions that were already in combat. One battalion, the 740th, was stripped when it arrived in Europe in December 1944. Then it was hastily refitted from a British tank repair depot on 18 December and was flung into the path of KG Pieper during the Ardennes Offensive. The 740th's odd lot of equipment included M4s, Fireflies, M10 and M36 tank destroyers, and M8 armored cars, all of which were equipped with British radios -- which the Americans didn't know how to use! Despite this handicap the battalion (actually a reinforced company) materially assisted in halting Pieper's advance west of Stoumont Station by a combination of good luck and excellent gunnery.

As first organized, the armored regiments medium tank was the M3A1 or M3A4 Grant, the light tank was the M3 or M3A1 Stuart, and the assault gun was the T30 Howitzer Motor Carriage (a 105mm howitzer mounted on an armored halftrack). In early 1943 the M4 Sherman the M3 series. Later in 1943 the M5 Stuart replaced the M3 and a purpose designed assault gun, the M8 HMC 75mm, replaced the T30. The M4 105mm assault gun in turn replaced the M8 in early 1944, except in the light tank battalions.

A total of 16 armored divisions were eventually organized (1st-14th, 16th, and 20th). Of these, only two, the 2nd and the 3rd retained the "heavy" organization throughout the war. All of the other divisions were reorganized as light divisions prior to leaving the US (except the 1st, which converted to the light organization while in Italy during July 1944). All of the armored divisions served in the ETO or in Italy.

The light armor division organization (TO&E 17-2, dated 15 September 1943) included a Division Headquarters and Headquarters (H&H) Company, two Combat Command Headquarters (CCA and CCB), a Reserve Combat Command Headquarters (CCR), three tank battalions (of three medium and one light tank companies), three armored infantry battalions, three eighteen-gun artillery battalions, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron (battalion), an engineer battalion, and division services. The division was commanded by a major general, the combat commands by a brigadier general (who was also assistant division commander) and two colonels. The division included 77 light tanks, 168 medium tanks, 18 M4 105mm assault guns, 54 M7 105mm SP artillery pieces, 54 M8 armored cars, 450 halftracks, 1,031 motor vehicles, and 8 light observation aircraft. Total personnel strength was 10,754.

Two problems with the light armored division as it was organized were quickly found after the divisions first entered combat in Normandy in June 1944. First, was that the division had insufficient truck transport space to haul the basic load of supplies authorized. To correct this, two Quartermaster Truck companies were permanently attached to each of the light armored divisions. Second, was that the CCR Headquarters as organized was only capable of administrative functions and consisted of only eight officers and men. It quickly became obvious that the ability to field a third, tactical headquarters was highly desirable. As a result, many of the light divisions had an Armor Group Headquarters attached to augment CCR (the armor group had proven redundant as a tactical headquarters commanding separate tank battalions and were usually assigned to corps).

The heavy armored division organization (TO&E 17-1, dated 1 March 1942, with Changes 1 & 2, dated to 29 October 1942) included two three-battalion tank regiments (the 1st battalion was light, with three light tank companies, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were medium, each with three medium tank companies), a three-battalion armored infantry regiment, and only two combat commands, the rest of the divisional units were nearly identical to those in the light division. The heavy division included 158 light tanks, 232 medium tanks, 24 M4 105mm assault guns, 17 M8 assault guns, 54 M7 105mm SP artillery pieces, 54 M8 armored cars, 640 halftracks, 1,242 motor vehicles, and 8 light observation aircraft. The total personnel strength of the division was 14,664.

Another problem was associated with both the light and the heavy armor divisions. Theoretically the armor division was intended to act as the maneuver reserve for the corps and to break through enemy fronts ruptured by infantry assaults supported by the separate battalions. The armor division was to conduct deep pursuit of the enemy once the front was broken through. In practice, the width of the front in Europe meant that armored divisions were often used in static defensive roles, for which they were not designed. A critical weakness was the fact that the infantry component of the division was to small to withstand the attrition of long-term defensive or offensive missions. Although they were each over 1,000 men strong, many of the personnel in the armored infantry battalions were drivers, mechanics, or manned heavy weapons. As a result, the actual "rifle" strength of the battalion was somewhat less than one-half that, 450 men.

The armor regiment was organized with nine companies (lettered A-I), a Headquarters and Headquarters (H&H) Company, an Assault Gun Company, a Reconnaissance Company, a Service Company, and a Maintenance Company. The battalions in the regiment each had a small H&H Company (with a Mortar Platoon) and a Service Company.

The tank battalions of the light armor division and the separate medium tank battalions were all organized identically. They had four lettered companies (A-C and D, which was a light tank company), a Service Company, and an H&H Company with a HQ, a Mortar Platoon, a Reconnaissance Platoon, and an Assault Gun Platoon.

The MX battalions were similarly organized, but had three MX Tank companies, lettered A-C, and a medium company, D, which provided gunfire support.

The separate light tank battalions had only three companies (A-C), and were equipped with three M8 HMC in an Assault Gun Section in the H&H Company, rather than with a six-gun M4 105mm platoon as in the medium tank battalions.

One-hundred-and-eighteen tank battalions were eventually formed. One was the sole pre-war Regular Army separate battalion (70th). Ten additional Regular Army battalions were formed in 1941, prior to the outbreak of war (originally the 71st-80th, they were later redesignated the 751st-760th). Four were organized from prewar National Guard tank companies (191st-194th). Seventy-one were created by the reorganization of the armored divisions (1st-6th, 8th-11th, 13th-27th, 31st, 34th-48th, 68th, 69th, 80th, 81st, 706th-718th, 771st-780th, and 786th-788th). Thirty were formed as separate battalions (28th, 701st, 702nd, 735th-750th, 761th-764th, 766th, 767th, 781st-785th). Two were created by converting existing tank destroyer battalions (the 662nd and 812th). Two were destroyed in the Philippines on 9 April 1942, the 192nd and 194th Light (except B/194th which remained behind and was reorganized as the 602nd Medium Tank Com

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US Army in World War II

Cavalry and Infantry

by Rich Anderson

Cavalry

Reconnaissance in the armored divisions was performed by the armored reconnaissance battalion -- in the heavy division -- or by the cavalry reconnaissance squadron, mechanized -- in the light division. These units were identical, except that the battalion was organized as companies, the squadron as troops (although the light tank unit was a company in both organizations). In addition, each armored regiment had a reconnaissance company and each infantry division a reconnaissance troop (organized the same as below), while each tank battalion had a reconnaissance platoon.

The mechanized cavalry squadrons were organized with three Cavalry Troops, lettered A to C, each equipped with 13 M8 armored cars and jeeps; an Assault Gun Troop, E, with six M8 HMC; a Light Tank Company, F, with 17 M5 Stuart, or later M24, tanks; a Service Company; and an H&H Company. The armored divisions reconnaissance squadron was identical except that it had a fourth Cavalry Troop, D, and the Assault Gun Troop had eight M8 HMC. Infantry divisions each had a single cavalry reconnaissance troop.

Cavalry groups were usually assigned to corps, but were occasionally attached -- by squadron -- to divisions. Cavalry was primarily intended for reconnaissance missions. However, during the war they were usually employed in defensive, economy of force, security, or screening missions. Armored field artillery, engineer, and tank destroyer units reinforced the cavalry groups for most missions.

Interestingly, the cavalry groups were almost never called to perform their primary duty: Later analysis showed that pure reconnaissance missions accounted for only 3 percent of their activities. The remaining 97 percent of missions assigned included: defensive operations (33 percent); special operations "including acting as mobile reserve, providing for security and control of rear areas, and operating as an army information service" (29 percent); security missions "blocking, screening, protecting flanks, maintaining contact between units, and filling gaps" (25 percent); and offensive operations (10 percent).

Thirteen mechanized cavalry groups fought in Europe. They were the 2nd (2nd and 42nd Squadrons); 3rd (3rd and 43rd Squadrons); 4th (4th and 24th Squadrons); 6th (6th and 28th Squadrons); 11th (36th and 44th Squadrons); 14th (18th and 32nd Squadrons); 15th (15th and 17th Squadrons); 16th (16th and 19th Squadrons); 101st (101st and 116th Squadrons); 102nd (38th and 102nd Squadrons); 106th (106th and 121st Squadrons); 113th (113th and 125th Squadrons); and 115th (104th and 107th Squadrons). In addition, the 117th Squadron served with the Seventh Army in Southern France and the 91st Squadron served with the Fifth Army in Italy.

Finally, a number of separate mechanized cavalry troops existed, among them the 56th (which remained in the U.S.) and the 302nd assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division in the Pacific.

In addition to the mechanized cavalry, the US Army fielded a number of horse-cavalry units during the war, including the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions and the 56th Cavalry Brigade with the 112th and 124th Cavalry Regiments (Texas National Guard), and the 26th Cavalry Regiment (Philippine Scouts). Of these, only the 26th Cavalry fought mounted, during the Campaign in the Philippines in 1941 and 1942. The 1st Cavalry Division, the 112th and 124th Cavalry all were sent to the Pacific, where they fought dismounted as infantry. Finally, the 2nd Cavalry Division was originally activated in April 1941 as a racially mixed division, with one 'Colored' Cavalry Brigade and one 'White' Cavalry Brigade. It was inactivated in July 1942 only to be reactivated in February 1943 as a 'Colored' Division. It was sent to North Africa where it was inactivated again in May 1944 with its personnel reassigned to service and engineer labor units.

Infantry

The US mobilized sixty-seven infantry divisions in World War II. They were the 1st-9th, 10th Mountain, 24th-38th, 40th-45th, 63rd, 65th, 66th, 69th-71st, 75th-81st, 83rd-91st, 92nd and 93rd Colored, 94th-100th, 102nd-104th, 106th, and Americal Infantry Divisions, 11th, 13th, 17th, 82nd, and 101st Airborne Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division, which was dismounted and utilized as infantry. Forty-two of the infantry divisions and four of the airborne divisions served in the ETO and MTO, the remainder served in the PTO.

The first permanent divisional organization in the U. S. Army appeared in World War I. Nine of these infantry divisions continued to exist through the 1920s and 1930s. These were "square" (two two-regiment brigades) organizations which were replaced, after considerable arguments and field tests, by a "triangular" organization of three regiments. By early 1942 the division was organized substantially the way it would be used in battle, with, in addition to its three infantry regiments, four artillery battalions (three twelve-tube 105mm light battalions and one twelve-tube 155mm howitzer medium battalion), a cavalry reconnaissance troop, and division service troops. A major general commanded the division. A brigadier general was assistant division commander and a second brigadier general was division artillery commander. Colonels commanded the infantry regiments and lieutenant colonels the battalions.

In mid 1944 (TO&E 7, dated 15 July 1943) the infantry division had 18 M3 105mm infantry howitzers, 36 M2 105mm howitzers, 12 M1 155mm howitzers, 5 halftracks, 13 M8 armored cars, 1,371 motor vehicles, and 10 light observation aircraft. Total personnel strength was 14,253.

The infantry regiment was organized with three battalions, twelve lettered companies (A-M, skipping J), an Infantry Cannon Company (first equipped with two halftrack-mounted 105mm howitzers and six halftrack-mounted 75mm howitzers or guns, and later with a towed short-barrelled 105mm howitzer), an Antitank (AT) Company (initially with twelve 37mm and later nine 57mm AT guns), and a Service Company. The fourth company in each battalion (D, H, M) were heavy weapons companies with sustained fire heavy machine guns and mortars. The regiment and each battalion also had a H&H Company. The regimental H&H Company included a Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, the battalion H&H company included an Amunition and Pioneer (A&P, responsible for light engineering duties and for transporting ammunition forward to the line companies) Platoon and an AT Platoon (initially with four 37mm and later with 3 57mm AT guns).

In theory the US infantry regiment of World War II was a powerful, flexible organization and was the core of the infantry division. Unfortunately, poor personnel replacement planning in the early years of the war meant that after a few weeks of combat the regiment was chronically understrength. As an example, on 1 December 1944 the Third Army was understrength in infantrymen by the equivalent of 55 rifle companies. In effect, this meant that on average each of Third Army's infantry divisions were at two-thirds strength in their rifle companies.

The crisis reached a peak in January 1945, when the full extent of the casualties resulting from the Battle of the Bulge were felt. Stringent economy measures and a reorganization of the replacement pool improved matters in February. However, it must be said that the only thing that finally solved the problem was the end of the war.

Besides the standard infantry division, the Army also experimented with a number of specialized divisions. The light division (Alpine Pack or Jungle) and motorized division organizations were not used in combat and were converted to standard infantry divisions. However, the airborne divisions and the mountain division did enter combat.

The airborne division underwent many official (as well as semiofficial and unofficial) changes during the war. As originally conceived they were primarily infantry fo

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发表时间： 2008-2-17 23:32:53 　

US Army in World War II

Artillery and AA Artillery

by Rich Anderson

Chemical Weapons

The 4.2" mortar battalions provided chemical warfare (WP, smoke, and gas) support to Army divisions. Originally without an HE capability, inasmuch as there were no HE rounds for the 4.2" mortar, in late 1942 a bright CW officer thought that it would be a good idea to provide an HE round for the piece. As a result the chemical mortars were available to provide welcome heavy mortar support for the infantry by 1943. By the fall of 1944 there were sufficient battalions in the ETO to allow for a normal assignment of one company per infantry division. In some circumstances this would be augmented to a full battalion.

The 2nd, 3rd, 81st, 83rd, 86th, 87th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, and 99th Battalions served in the ETO. The 84th and 100th Battalions served in Italy. The 71st, 80th, 82nd, 85th, 88th, and 98th Battalions served in the PTO.

Artillery

In World War I the artillery arm of the U.S. Army had fought in Europe equipped entirely with French or British weapons. There were many reasons for this: the need to standardize Allied arms, lack of shipping space, and lack of industrial capacity. However, another factor was that many ordnance specialists in Britain and France felt that the indigenous American gun designs were not up to European standards. As a result, in 1921 the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Charles P. Sommerall (one of the most brilliant artillerymen in U.S. Army history) established the Westervelt Board to examine the army's ordnance requirements for the future. The board's report was impartial and farsighted, and it had dramatic consequences for the U.S. Army artillery in World War II. The board recommended that the standard divisional artillery piece be increased in caliber from 75mm to 105mm, while the general support weapon for the division was to be standardized as the 155mm howitzer. The 4.7" corps general support gun (a British design) was to be discarded in favor of the 155mm gun (a French design). In addition, the board recommended that heavier pieces of the most modern type be designed, and that all artillery pieces be suitable for rapid motorized road movement. Finally, improvements in fire control methodology and communications were recommended, based upon concepts that had been pioneered by Summerall as an artillery brigade commander in France.

The financial climate of the 1920s and 1930s delayed the deployment of such an improved artillery system. However, sufficient funding was available to allow innovative Artillery and Ordnance officers to continue experimenting with new gun designs and doctrine. As a result, when the Army began to expand, much of the background work to modernize the artillery was already complete. Designs had been completed and prototypes developed and tested for most of the guns and howitzers that were to see service during the war (the opposite of the situation in the new Armor Branch, where prohibitive cost had stymied design work on armored vehicle prototypes and doctrinal experimentation during the 1920s and 1930s).

Divisional pieces included the M1 105mm howitzer and the M1 155mm howitzer. Both were excellent weapons, with good range and, particularly in the case of the 155mm, excellent accuracy. Other new weapons were the M1 75mm pack howitzer and the M3 105mm howitzer. Both were lightweight and could be easily broken down into manageable loads suitable for transportation by pack animal (horse, mule, or man as available) or by air, and if relatively short-ranged, were ideal for airborne forces. The M3 also saw service after 1943 in the Cannon Company of the infantry regiment. A SP version of the M1 105mm, the M7 Priest, also equipped the field artillery battalions of the armor division.

Non-divisional artillery pieces included battalions equipped with these same weapons, as well as other, heavier pieces. A companion of the 155mm howitzer was the 4.5" gun (an indigenous 120mm gun was one of the few failures of the inter-war design projects). The tube of this gun was of British design, while the carriage was that of the 155mm howitzer (carriage commonality between companion guns and howitzers was one of the hallmarks of U.S. artillery designs). Unfortunately, the 4.5" -- although well liked by American artillerymen - was not a very efficient weapon for its size. The shell (also of British design) was of low-grade steel, thick-walled and with a small bursting charge compared to the shell weight. The 4.5" projectile weighed 54.90 pounds, but had only a 4.49 pound bursting charge, while the 105mm howitzer projectile weighed 33 pounds, but had a 4.8 pound bursting charge. Its range was insufficient to compensate for the relative ineffectiveness of this round and as a result it was withdrawn from service soon after the end of the war.

A much more effective weapon was the M1 155mm gun, known as a "Long Tom" (an appellation with a long and glorious tradition in the U.S. artillery.) It combined long range, accuracy, and hitting power with a well designed, mobile carriage.

A different 155mm gun was the M12 SP. Developed in 1942, it was an interesting amalgam of the old and the new, utilizing the tube of the pre-war French designed GPF (Grand Puissance, Failloux), itself developed in World War II, and the chassis of the obsolescent M3 Grant tank. It was an experiment by the Ordnance Department that had been turned down by the AGF in October 1943 on the grounds that there was no requirement for it. However, in early 1944 urgent requests from U.S. Army forces in England for a heavy SP gun resulted in 74 being rebuilt. They eventually equipped seven field artillery battalions in the ETO and proved invaluable. An improved model, the M40, based upon the M1 gun and M4 tank, was produced in 1944 and deployed in limited numbers to the ETO in March 1945.

Heavier supporting artillery pieces were the M1 8" howitzer, an excellent and accurate weapon; the M1 8" gun, which was developed as an answer to the superb German 17cm gun, had greater range and a more lethal shell than the German weapon, but suffered from poor accuracy and excessive barrel wear; and the 240mm howitzer, a good, if very heavy, weapon.

Nearly all US artillery battalions were organized with three firing batteries and a total of twelve tubes. The exception was the eighteen-tube armored field artillery battalion and the six-tube 8" gun and 240mm howitzer battalions. A major advantage for the American artillery was that it was fully motorized and highly mobile. All 105mm and 155mm howitzer battalions in the ETO were truck-drawn, although a Table of Equipment (TE) for a tractor-drawn 155mm battalion existed. The 155mm gun battalions were almost all tractor-drawn, although a few evidently were also truck-drawn. The 4.5" gun, 8" gun, 8" howitzer, and 240mm howitzer battalions were all tractor-drawn, although, again, a TE for truck drawn battalions existed. The standard prime mover was a two-and-one-half ton truck for the 105mm and a 4-ton Diamond T truck for the 155mm howitzers. Tractors included the M5 thirteen-ton prime movers, which were utilized for the 105mm M2 howitzer, the 4.5" gun, and 155mm M1 howitzer, and the M4 eighteen-ton hi-speed, full-track, heavy prime mover, which was utilized for the 3" AA gun, the 90mm AA gun, the 155mm Long Tom gun, 8" howitzer, 8" gun, and 240mm howitzer. Redundant M3 medium tank chassis, without armament, and M31 and M32 armored recovery vehicles were also utilized as prime movers for the heavier artillery pieces.

Non-divisional artillery battalions were normally subordinated to field artillery groups. The groups were formed in 1943 from the headquarters battery of the broken up field artillery regiments. The field artillery group consisted of an H&H Battery, with a command element and a fire-direction center element, and a Service Battery. A group was usually

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发表时间： 2008-2-17 23:35:50 　

US Army in World War II

Engineers and Logistics

by Rich Anderson

Engineers

It was perhaps fitting that the U.S. Army, with an officer corps heavily influenced by the teachings of the United States Military Academy (which was the first engineering school in the United States), should be lavishly equipped with engineer troops and equipment. The divisional combat engineer battalions were capable of performing most engineering tasks (including demolitions, obstacle emplacement, fortification, and light bridge building) for the division. Additional battalions from corps or army augmented divisional engineers for more extensive tasks. Corps battalions were assigned to the command of an engineer group headquarters, which consisted of an H&H Company and an engineer light equipment company. Normally there were between three and six battalions in an engineer group and one or two groups per corps or army.

Combat engineer battalions tended to have high esprit de corps; they rightly considered themselves to be elite specialists. In a pinch, combat engineers also could act as infantry and did so frequently. In the Battle of the Bulge, a handful of engineer battalions proved to be a vital asset to the beleaguered American Army.

In addition to the combat engineer battalions there were in the Army a number of other general engineer units. The Engineer Amphibian Brigade was designed to support amphibious operations and included an H&H Company, three boat-and-shore regiments, a boat maintenance battalion, a medical battalion, and a quartermaster, ordnance, and a signal company. A single amphibian brigade (with naval support) was capable of transporting and landing an infantry division. Later, the brigade was strengthened and re-designated as the Engineer Special Brigade. Six Engineer Special Brigades, numbered 1st to 6th, were eventually formed. The 1st served in the MTO, ETO and PTO, the 5th and 6th served in the ETO, the others all served in the PTO.

Engineer aviation regiments and battalions were designed to construct and maintain air bases. Aviation engineers included engineer airborne aviation battalions, which were designed to be air transportable; so as to repair airfields captured by airborne forces.

Engineer bridging units included heavy ponton (the word pontoon is properly pronounced ponton, and beginning in World War II, that is the way it has been spelled by U.S. Army Engineers) battalions (nineteen formed, allotted usually one to three per army), light ponton companies (usually one per engineer group), and treadway bridge companies (usually one per armored division, but held at corps).

Engineer general service regiments and battalions performed construction, repair, and maintenance duties of all kinds behind the front lines. Many general service battalions were formed as pools of unskilled labor troops, usually African-American, and later were organized as regiments. Fifty-five of the 103 general service regiments that were formed were Colored units.

Engineer special service regiments (seven formed) contained highly skilled construction personnel and had a large allotment of heavy equipment. The remainder of the engineer corps was made up of various specialist units, topographic, water supply, railway, oil field, railway operating, and camouflage battalions. In addition, there were large numbers of separate companies and even specialist engineer detachments consisting of a few officers and men. Over 600 battalion-size engineer units were formed during the war.

Curiously, only the engineer combat regiments were broken up into separate battalions as a part of the pool concept in 1943. The H&H Company of the engineer combat regiments were re-designated as engineer combat groups in 1943. The other specialized engineer regiments were retained to the end of the war.

Transportation and Logistics

The U.S. Army transportation and logistic network performed prodigious feats in World War II. Millions of tons of food, weapons, and equipment, and millions of men were transported to every corner of the globe. Supplies were moved by ship to ports in the war zones and then to forward supply bases. Quartermaster units attached to the armies then moved the supplies forward to corps supply dumps. Divisional quartermaster units then, in turn, moved the supplies forward and distributed them to units. Ground transport was by railroad, truck, and, in many theaters, mule-pack and man-pack. Ammunition supply was performed in a similar manner, except that it was the responsibility of the Ordnance Corps.

In general, most types of supply were plentiful. Food, clothing and general equipment items were usually plentiful. However, gasoline (petrol), oil, and lubricants (called POL, a term inherited from the British) and ammunition tended to be in short supply at many times in most theaters of war. POL could be difficult to get forward, container trucks and trailers worked well for unit distribution, but were inefficient for long hauls, as was the case in Europe. The solution in Europe was PLUTO (for pipeline under the ocean), a POL pipeline (actually a number of separate pipelines) laid across the English Channel and with a terminus that eventually reached to Belgium. In the Pacific, it was often a simple matter of tying up a tanker to a pier and pumping fuel directly into trucks on the dock.

Ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, tended to be a much more pernicious problem. In the early stages of the Army's expansion there were plans calling for a high priority in the production of 105mm shells of all types, inasmuch as these were the standard, general-support divisional field piece. Ammunition for heavier guns was accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the utility of large, unwieldy and relatively immobile large artillery pieces. Unfortunately, a number of factors then intervened. First, congressional criticism was raised over large over stocks of all types of artillery ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943. The Army was pressured to scale back production, particularly of 105mm ammunition. Secondly, the perceived need for an expansion of the heavy and medium artillery was mirrored by an expansion of the production facilities for the heavier types of shells. The expansion in heavy shell production was facilitated by converting light ammunition production to heavy. Thus, by late 1943 priorities had shifted radically. Many plants were retooling for other production, while some 105mm plants were closed completely. Events in France and Italy in mid 1944 then changed all the assumptions again. The fierce German resistance in the bocage of Normandy and in the Appenine Mountains of Italy placed a premium on all types of ammunition - just as stocks of 105mm ammunition began to shrink. Rationing was instituted (and extended to most other types of mortar and artillery ammunition), and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized against their former owners. By 1 January 1945 the entire ETO stock of 105mm ammunition was reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, a twenty-one-day supply according to War Department planning factors, which were widely acknowledged to be too optimistic. The poor flying weather encountered in Europe in the fall and winter exacerbated this near-disastrous situation: Allied airpower was not always available to take up the slack. Although emergency measures in theater and in the U.S. improved matters, artillery ammunition shortages were to remain a chronic problem until the end of the war in Europe.

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发表时间： 2008-2-17 23:36:34 　

US Army in World War II

Manpower and Segregation

by Rich Anderson

Manpower, Replacements, and the Segregated Army

In late 1944 a severe problem in the U.S. Army in general was the manpower shortage. Plans to expand the Army to 213 divisions were never met and it was proving difficult to maintain the 89 divisions then in existence - even though almost one-quarter of them had yet to see combat. Furthermore, the prewar planning for replacements was found to be totally inadequate. The causes were manifold: U.S. industrial and agricultural demands could only be partially met by bringing women into the workforce; the Army was fighting a two-front war; fear of the blitzkrieg had resulted in an over-expansion of the antiaircraft and tank destroyer arms; the requirements of the massive expansion of the U.S. Armed Forces in general had reduced the manpower pool; and, perhaps worst of all, segregation meant that a large percentage o the available manpower, African-Americans, were restricted to service support organization and a few separate combat units.

Unfortunately, the poor initial planning Army-wide was exacerbated by the general replacement policy in effect. Simply put, once a soldier was separated from his unit by wounds or illness, there was little chance of him returning to that unit. Instead, he was sent to a replacement depot, a repple-depple in Army slang. From the depot he would then be reassigned as needed to whatever unit had a shortfall in his particular MOS (military occupation specialty). This meant that a soldier could spend months of training, forming close bonds with comrades, the basis for unit cohesion, and then in his first day of combat could be separated from them, never to fight with them again. This system of individual replacement caused many soldiers to disguise illness and wounds so they could stay with their units. Other soldiers, in hospital, went AWOL (absent-without-leave) so as to rejoin their units. It wasn't until 1945 that the individual replacement system was modified to allow a majority of sick and wounded soldiers to rejoin their unit after recovering.

At the other end of the replacement pipeline, replacements were trained by replacement centers (or stripped from divisions), shipped as anonymous replacement increments to a theater of war, and held at the repple-depple until needed by units. These men were military orphans with little esprit de corps and no cohesion. Many thought of themselves as replaceable parts in the giant army "machine," or as rounds of ammunition. The sole virtue of this system was that it allowed divisions to stay in near continuous combat for days on end, theoretically without eroding their numerical strength. As casualties left, replacements came in. However, the reality became that replacements came in, and with no combat experience and no one in their new unit looking out for them (the "I don't know him and don't want to know him, he's only gonna be a casualty" syndrome), they quickly became casualties.

Worse, the planning factors for replacements by branch were badly out of kilter. The original War Department replacement-planning factor for infantry was 64.3 percent of total casualties. Following continued pleas from Europe the factor was raised to 70.3 percent in April 1944. However, the fighting in Normandy soon showed that this was still much too low. By mid July the ETO estimate was that 90 percent of total casualties occurred in the infantry. Infantry divisions saw 100 percent losses in rifle strength in the two months after D-Day. The lack of Infantry replacements soon approached near disastrous proportions. For example, on 8 December 1944 the Third Army was short 11,000 infantrymen. This was only about four percent of the Third Army's total strength, but was the equivalent of fifty-five rifle companies - the rifle strength of two infantry divisions - or close to fifteen percent of the infantry combat power of the Third Army.

The Infantry further suffered from the Army's personnel policy, which allocated the most highly qualified and intelligent people to specialist arms (Airborne, Ranger, Artillery, Armor, and Engineers). The Infantry was filled with men who had scored lowest on the AGCT (the Army General Classification Test) - an intelligence and aptitude test and those who had not held a skilled job in civilian life. The elimination of the ASTP (the Army Specialized Training program), which allowed selected enlisted men to gain a college education while deferring induction into the Army and the reduction of specialized troop units (especially antiaircraft) had remedied matters to some degree by the end of 1944. Nevertheless, mediocre motivation and low intelligence continued to plague the Infantry.

Intense combat and heavy losses in 1943 meant that in 1944 many divisions still in the United States were stripped of trained men to build up the replacement pool. Some divisions were stripped of available manpower a second time later in 1944. This in turn affected the training cycle of the divisions, causing some to deploy late and requiring most to have some problems with their initial combat deployment. Four armor, one airborne, and seventeen infantry divisions (nearly one-quarter of the total formed) were eventually subject to large scale stripping of men (nearly all of the other divisions in training also had smaller numbers of personnel stripped out prior to deployment). Fourteen of the seventeen infantry divisions were stripped twice. The aggregate affect was tremendous the 69th Infantry Division lost 1,336 officers and 22,235 men, nearly enough personnel to form two divisions.

Exacerbating the Army manpower woes was the policy of segregation. In the 1940s Jim Crowism was rampant in the United States. Racism and segregation affected all aspects of society in the South. Matters were little better in the Northern and Western states. The effect was that over fifteen percent of the nations military manpower was underutilized. Most African-Americans were restricted to serving with Service and Supply units, many of which were simply pools of brute-force, unskilled labor.

Only three Colored divisions were formed during the war. Only one saw extensive combat service and it was plagued by problems. On the other hand, the few separate Colored combat battalions formed gave excellent service, most in the ETO.

The second 2nd Cavalry Division (originally it was the 3rd Cavalry Division, it became the 2nd Division when the original 2nd Division was disbanded) was disbanded in 1944. Ironically, the 2nd Cavalry Division was arguably one of the most experienced and professional divisions in the Army. The 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments of the division, known as the Buffalo Soldiers, were two of the most famous regiments in the Army. When the division was disbanded the men of these two great regiments were assigned as laborers to port and engineer battalions.

In Italy, the 92nd Division was placed under the command of Major General Edward M. Almond, an avowed racist. Almond despised his men believing them incapable of learning the duties of combat soldiers, training was perfunctory at best. Officers, who were mostly white, took their cue from General Almond and ignored many of their fundamental duties. In it's first engagements, the division appeared to confirm his fears, making little headway with heavy losses. The division was then reorganized in March and recommitted along the Ligurian coast, again with little effect. Post war studies of the use of African-American combat troops confirmed however that most of the divisions problems could be directly associated with poor training, poor leadership, and neglect of troops in the field.

The experience of the 93rd Division in the PTO was similar. It was split up and served mostly as labor parties on various Pacific islands. It suffered only 138 combat casualties however, losses to disease were severe.

Probabl

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主题: 二战中的美国陆军1616

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发表时间： 2008-2-18 8:59:53 　

嗯，这个题材有些太宽泛了吧，楼主翻译一下。

不要再悲叹哀怨，切莫再有泪空弹。用鲜花洗涤旧世，剑之锋血光闪闪。

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发表时间： 2008-2-20 15:44:23 　

二战论坛有翻译过

电子书下载 http://picasaweb.google.com/STG44TUJIBUQIANG /MP44TUJIBUQIANG /mp43TUJIBUQIANG

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主题: 二战中的美国陆军1624

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发表时间： 2008-2-20 16:41:40 　

晕，要不楼上给贴一下吧。

不要再悲叹哀怨，切莫再有泪空弹。用鲜花洗涤旧世，剑之锋血光闪闪。

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主题: 二战中的美国陆军1626

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发表时间： 2008-2-20 18:56:01 　

特别提示：本帖子在 2008-2-20 20:30:26 由用户 admin 编辑过

现在去二战论坛翻那个帖子,好象已经和谐掉了,我以前有个备份

二战美国陆军

原著：瑞奇·安德森

翻译：方懿

导言

美国陆军从战前那支微型的军队重建花费了3年时间。1939年6月30日，陆军现役军人总数187893人，其中陆军航空队22387人；国民警卫队199491人。主要作战部队包括陆军的9个步兵师、2个骑兵师、1个机械化骑兵（装甲）旅和国民警卫队的18个步兵师。装备陈旧落后，国民警卫队训练参差不齐，水平从还可以到糟糕。

1939年9月，欧洲战争爆发导致美国陆军逐步扩军。1940年8月27日，国会批准将国民警卫队纳入联邦现役。1940年9月16日，国会通过了美国历史上第一个和平时期征兵法案，但兵役期只有1年。幸运的是，1941年8月7日，国会投票以简单多数通过了不定期延长国民警卫队员、被征士兵和预备军官服役期。4个月后，日本偷袭了珍珠港。

1941年12月7日，美国陆军总兵力1685403人，其中陆军航空队275889人，编成29个步兵师、5个装甲师和2个骑兵师。增长到原有规模435％是一个显著成就，但严重缺乏装备和训练有素的人员。其后3年半时间里，陆军又增长到1941年12月7日的492％，达到8291336人，编成89个师：66个步兵师、5个空降师、16个装甲师、1个骑兵师和1个山地师。

1944年12月16日，部署到欧洲战区的有43个师，包括2个空降师、10个装甲师和31个步兵师。另外还有超过16个师准备投入欧洲前线：1个装甲师正在开往前线的路上；1个空降师、1个装甲师和2个步兵师在英格兰等待船运到法国；1个空降师、3个装甲师和7个步兵师在美国本土处于训练的最后阶段或者开往欧洲的途中，但都不可能在1944年结束前完整投入到欧洲大陆。

欧洲战争结束时，欧洲战区总共投入61个师：15个装甲师、42个步兵师和4个空降师（13空降师没有投入战斗）。地中海战区投入7个师：1个装甲师、5个步兵师和第10山地师。太平洋战区投入21个师：1个骑兵师（第1骑兵师）、19个步兵师（其中第98步兵师没有投入战斗）和1个空降师。

美国部队作战表现中的很多问题都可以直接归咎于一点。一般来说，美国陆军装备精良，后勤补给是所有参战国中最好的。可是，一般公认的观点，即美国陆军纯粹依靠数量优势压倒对手是不正确的。美国扩张的工业为作战部队提供了稳定的物资供应，但战争中供应短缺，特别是坦克和火炮的弹药，及兵员补充一直困饶美军。

陆军地面力量的编制

1942年3月29日，陆军总司令部改组的一项主要措施是成立了陆军地面力量（the Army Ground Force，缩写AGF）。AGF负责除陆军航空队以外所有地面部队的编组、训练和装备。AGF首任指挥官是陆军少将J·莱斯里·麦克奈尔（后升任陆军中将，1944年7月25日死于美国陆军航空队的误炸）。麦克奈尔对陆军的编制拥有最终决定权。他不屈不挠的致力于削减师的上层机构，强调尽可能流线型。这么做的理由有两个：首先船位不但用于运送作战部队，而且还有支援部队，所有的补给物资都必须从美国经过漫长的距离运送到外国港口。第二，麦克奈尔和其他计划制定者都认识到美国的人力资源并不是无穷无尽的。美国的工业和农业，海军、海军陆战队、海岸警卫队、陆军航空队和商船队的扩充都需要大量人员。1941年9月25日胜利计划设想的213个师的陆军是不可能实现的，最后编满89个师都显得极其困难。

共享化

麦克奈尔建立流线型陆军的努力的另一个结果就是将所有非师建制的作战部队都编成为同样类型的营级部队。这些共享化部队由军或集团军掌握，需要的时候加强到师。野战炮兵、工程兵、坦克、坦克歼击部队、高炮和步兵都是共享部队的组成部分。为了推进共享化，1943年2月所有已有的野战炮兵团、高炮团和工兵团都打散成独立营。团部随后都改组成群指挥部。群指挥群负责协调指挥集中的大批共享化部队。

番号规则

美国陆军集团军的番号使用英文直接拼写，军使用罗马数字，师、旅、团、营和排都使用阿拉伯数字，连用字母。

军、集团军和集团军群

战争结束时，陆军拥有24个军，除第36军外都投入了海外战场。其中三个是作为装甲军编成，第1装甲军在摩洛哥解编，人员随后编成第7集团军，第2装甲军改组成第18空降军，第3装甲军改组成第19军。其他各军番号为第1军到第16军、第20军到第24军和第36军。

最终拥有12个集团军指挥部。1945年，第一集团军、第三集团军、第七集团军、第九集团军、第十五集团军和第一盟军空降集团军部署在欧洲战区；第五集团军部署在地中海战区，第六集团军、第八集团军、第十集团军部署在太平洋战区，第二集团军和第四集团军部署在美国本土负责训练。

最后组建了3个集团军群指挥部。第六和第十二集团军群部署在欧洲战区，第十五集团军群部署在地中海战区。

除个别例外，所有的集团军和军都是战前就已编组或预备或由AGF在战时编组。然而，第五、第六和第七集团军，第一盟军空降集团军和所有集团军群都是在海外组建的。

装甲兵

美国装甲兵战时经历了数次的改组——大部分是因为任务需要进行的。这些改组中最具有意义的是1943年装甲师改编和1944年末到1945年初欧洲大部分坦克营改进装备表。当时欧洲中型坦克的损失速度超过陆军补充能力，改进装备表将营属中型坦克的数量从53辆削减到41辆。部署在欧洲的所有轻型装甲师和独立坦克营在1944年秋都开始这一改进。1944年末抵达的那些师（第8装甲师、第9装甲师、第10装甲师和第11装甲师）和独立坦克营可能保留了最初的装备表，尽管一些独立坦克营被临时剥离装备用于补充已参战坦克营的库存。例如1944年12月抵达欧洲的第740坦克营。接着于12月18日，迅速从一个英国坦克修理仓库重新装备，急行军投入突出部战役拦截派普尔战斗群。第740坦克营零星装备了M4、萤火虫坦克，M10、M36坦克歼击车，M8装甲车，全都装备英国无线电——美国人根本不知道如何使用！尽管有这些障碍，因为好运和优秀的炮术，第740坦克营（实际只有一个加强连）在湿陶蒙特站以西援助阻止了派普尔的进攻。

一开始，装甲兵的主力装备包括M3A1或M3A4“格兰特”中型坦克，M3或M3A1“斯图尔特”轻型坦克，105毫米T30榴弹炮机动载具。1943年初，M4“谢尔曼”中型坦克开始取代M3“格兰特”中型坦克。1943年末，M5“斯图尔特”轻型坦克开始取代M3系列；新设计的75毫米M8榴弹炮机动载具取代T30。1944年初，105毫米M4突击炮依次取代了除轻型坦克营以外的M8。

最后总共组建了16个装甲师（第1装甲师到第14装甲师，第16装甲师和第20装甲师）。其中只有两个——第2装甲师和第3装甲师在战时保持了“重”型编制。所有其他装甲师在离开美国前都重组为“轻”型师（除了第1装甲师是于1944年7月在意大利重组为“轻”型师）。全部装甲师都投入欧洲战区或地中海战区。

轻型装甲师编制（1943年9月15日编制和装备表17-2）包括师部连，2个战斗群指挥部（A战斗群和B战斗群），1个预备战斗群指挥部（R战斗群），3个坦克营（每个辖3个中型坦克连和1个轻型坦克连），3个装甲步兵营，3个18门炮的炮兵营，1个机械化骑兵侦察营，1个工兵营和师属后勤。师长由1名少将担任，战斗群指挥官由1名准将（也是副师长）和2名上校担任。全师总共拥有77辆轻型坦克、168辆中型坦克、18辆105毫米M4突击炮、54辆105毫米M7自行榴弹炮、54辆M8装甲车、450辆半履带车、1031辆汽车和8架轻型观察机，总兵力10754人。

轻型装甲师于1944年6月在诺曼底第一次投入战斗后暴露出编制上的两个问题。首先，师属卡车的运输能力不足以运输基本的额定补给。为解决这个问题，每个轻型师增加了2个军需卡车连。其次，预备战斗群指挥部编制只有8名军官和士兵，只能担负行政管理任务。很明显，第三个野战指挥部是值得建立的。结果，大部分轻型装甲师都为预备战斗群加强了一个装甲群指挥部（装甲群指挥部通常隶属于军，实践证明由其负责独立坦克营的战术指挥是多余的）。

重型装甲师的编制（1942年3月1日编制和装备表17-1，1942年10月29日调整1和2）包括2个3营制坦克团（第1营是轻型坦克营，辖3个轻型坦克连；第2营、第3营是中型坦克营，各辖3个中型坦克连），1个3营制装甲步兵团，只有2个战斗群指挥部，其余师属部队和轻型装甲师几乎完全一样。重型装甲师拥有158辆轻型坦克、232辆中型坦克、24辆105毫米M4突击炮、17辆M8突击炮、54辆105毫米M7自行榴弹炮、54辆M8装甲车、640辆半履带车、1042辆汽车和8架轻型观察机，总兵力14664人。

轻型和重型装甲师都存在另外一个问题。理论上由独立坦克营支援步兵撕裂敌人的防线，装甲师作为军的机动预备队投入突破口实施纵深追击。实践中，由于欧洲战线太宽，装甲师经常用于静态防御，这并非他们计划的任务。一个明显的弱点是师属步兵太少不足以应付长期的攻防消耗。虽然装甲步兵营兵力超过1000，但大部分是驾驶员、机械师或者重武器操作员。结果实际“步兵”兵力不足一半，只有450人。

装甲团下辖9个连（A-I连）、团部连、1个突击炮连、1个侦察连、1个后勤连和1个维修连。团属营每个有1个小一些的营部连（含1个迫击炮排）和1个后勤连。

轻型装甲师的坦克营和独立中型坦克营编制相同，都拥有4个连（A-C连和装备轻型坦克的D连），1个后勤连，1个营部连（1个营部排、1个迫击炮排、1个侦察排和1个突击炮排）。

混合坦克营编制类似，下辖3个混合坦克连（A-C连）和1个负责火力支援的中型坦克连（D连）。

独立轻型坦克营只有3个连（A-C连），营部连含1个装备3门M8机动榴弹炮载具的突击炮群，而非中型坦克营的6门105毫米M4突击炮排。

最后一共组建了118个坦克营。一个是战前陆军唯一一个独立坦克营（第70坦克营）。1941年战争爆发前又组建了10个营（最初番号是第71-80坦克营，后重新分配为第751-760坦克营）。前国民警卫队坦克连编组成4个营（第191-194坦克营）。整编装甲师组建了71个营（第1-6、8-11、13-27、31、34-48、68、69、80、81、706-718、771-780、786-788坦克营）。作为独立坦克营组建了30个营（第28、701、702、

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