[烛光生存狂]-The Missile Race in the Middle East

The Missile Race in the Middle East

Is There A Way Out?

Reuven Pedatzur

Most of the countries in the Middle East are armed with ballistic missiles. Any political agreement which intends to resolve territorial disputes will necessarily consider also the control, limitation, or dismantling of these weapons.[1]

Over the years, the emergence of certain unwritten 'rules of the game' dictated ballistic missile use in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The policy not to resort to the use of these missiles, even though both sides possessed them, capable of striking deep inside enemy territory, strengthened the reliance on these rules. This tacit understanding on the non-use of missiles, especially against civilian targets and even in the most precarious situations, conferred on these weapons a reserved status, thereby considerably diminishing their threat on the battlefield.

Before the Gulf War, Israeli policy had been based on the premise that the probability of a missile attack against Israel was very low. But now, after the Gulf War and the launching of the Iraqi missiles against targets in Israel, any future defense policy must be based on the opposite assumption: that an attack is entirely probable, and that the reasonable possibility of one on the Israeli rear can no longer be ignored.[2]

Therefore the ballistic missile threat becomes an onerous burden on the Israeli defense establishment, which must accordingly develop appropriate operational responses. An enormous allocation of funds is bound up in the development of appropriate operational responses. Removing the missile threat or succeeding in containing it, then, become critical objectives of the negotiations between Israel and its Middle Eastern neighbors. ...

Regional control of ballistic missiles - disarmament efforts in the 1990s

The plans for ballistic missile control must be based on a regional approach, allowing for differences in the conditions, the players, and political and military considerations. The regional profile of the Middle East suggests that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to reach consensus on control, or the limitation of the ballistic missile forces in the region.[3]

To focus solely on proliferation is not enough; the traditional arms control approach of limiting numbers and types of weapon must be supplemented by measures addressing the most destabilizing factors in the Middle East. The importance countries ascribe to their missile forces is one of the vital considerations in devising arms control policies. Three approaches have traditionally guided efforts to control missile forces:

1. the imposition of quantitative and, less frequently, qualitative constraints on missiles;

2. limitations on the way states deploy missiles and conduct operations; and

3. elimination of entire categories of missile.

Six factors contribute to the attempt to arrive at a plan based on these traditional approaches:

1. the number of players;

2. the short ranges of the missiles;

3. the 'nuclear catch';

4. suppliers who do not abide by the 'rules';

5. the determination of the players; and

6. the influence of missile defense systems.

The number of players

At least ten countries in the region possess ballistic missiles (almost half the number of countries world-wide that have them), and at least six of those have equipped their missiles with chemical, and/or biological, warheads. It would be difficult to create a control plan that would address the interests of all the players. If only one country in the region decided not to take part in the arms control effort, it could be enough to doom any plan to control or limit the region's missile arsenals.

Given the nature of the players in the Middle East, their attitudes towards using weapons to resolve conflicts, and the great number of conflicts in the region, the likelihood that they will give up the missile option is slim. From the Israeli point of view it would be unacceptable to reach an agreement on the limitation or elimination of its ballistic missile arsenal that did not include all the other countries in the region.

The first issue in the consideration of any arms control agreement in any region is the scope of the region to be included. In conflictual regions, such as the Middle East, the core region is defined in terms of potential or actual states that might be involved in military confrontation in which nuclear weapons or threats could play a role. In comparison with the other areas in which regional agreements have been created, the Middle East is particularly complex.[4]

To be effective, an agreement would have to include all the member states of the Arab League (twenty two), as well as Iran and Israel, and stretch from Algeria in North Africa to Iran and the Persian Gulf. The large number and diversity of necessary participants, in itself, is a significant obstacle to agreement.[5]

Some of the countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq and Libya, do not take part in the peace process, while others such as Syria will not join in the multilateral talks; it will be impossible, however, to reach any agreement on arms control out of the context of the peace process.

Throughout the 1980s, Israel and the Arab states were divided on major issues of the process. While Israel insisted that the negotiations take place through direct face-to-face talks as part of a regional peace process, the continuing refusal of the Arab states (with the notable very important exception of Egypt) to end the state of war with Israel created an impasse. This basic obstacle was reduced, to some degree, in 1991, following the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, in which many of the parties participated (with the exception of Iraq, Iran, and Libya).

The Madrid Conference led to the establishment of a number of multilateral working groups, including one on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), which, for the first time, provided a format for direct negotiations on such issues. However, the refusal of Syria to participate, as well as the absence of Iran, Iraq, and Libya, limit the ability of ACRS to consider regional security issues such as the idea of control, monitoring, and disarmament of ballistic missiles in any detail. Without the active participation of all of these states in this or a similar forum, it is difficult to proceed towards any significant regional agreements.[6]

Another factor is the great number of missiles already existing in the region, estimated at between 1,200 and 2,000. Because of these figures, the number of countries involved, and the diversity of the territory in which the missiles are deployed, the ability to verify compliance with a control regime would be very limited.

The Middle East poses some very difficult verification requirements. There are a number of diverse political systems, ranging from open democracies to closed and tightly controlled dictatorships. In the case of closed societies, particularly those with relatively large territorial extents, it is possible to hide weapons development and production programs from international inspectors. The Iraqi case is a very good example. Both IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) inspectors have been attempting to determine the extent of the Iraqi capability since 1991. For almost eight years, the Iraqi government has been able to keep significant capabilities and information hidden from the international inspectors, despite the agreement guaranteeing access and cooperation as specified in UN Security Council 687.

The proximity of the countries

Because of the number of players, any imposing of limits on the range of missiles would be complicated. The western border of Iraq is less than 500 km from Tel Aviv, and because Iraq's western part is largely uninhabited, a retaliating Israeli missile would need a range of about 800 km to r

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