[烛光生存狂]-苏联KV-85重型坦克简介

The KV-85 heavy tank was not an epochal machine in the history of Russian tank design and construction. Although it was not produced in the thousands, this tank still made a contribution to the victory over fascism. The first attempts to arm a tank with a powerful 85-90 mm gun were undertaken before the war, in 1939. Development of these weapons was going on at the same time. Tests were conducted with production models of the T-28 and KV, but for a number of reasons were not conducted on the armament. Efforts of this nature were temporarily halted with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. As early as December 1941, Uralmash Factory recommended the U-12 85 mm gun, developed by designers Sidorenko and Usenko, for arming of the KV tank. But the high cost of the gun was excessive for that time and it was recognized as not cost effective to accept it for the armament.

KV-85重型坦克在苏联坦克设计和制造史上并不是一种划时代的产物。尽管它没有被大量生产，但它仍为战胜法西斯贡献了一份力量。在坦克安装85-99MM炮的首次尝试在1939年就开始着手施行。对这些武器研发工作也在同时进行。测试工作在T-28和KV的生产型上进行,但是由于很多原因,测试并没有包括武器系统。（此处英文可能有误）随着卫国战争的爆发，这种工作被暂时中止。1941年12月，VRALMASH工厂建议采用有工程师SIDORENKO和VSENKO设计的V-12型85MM炮作为KV坦克主要武器。但由于这种火炮太过昂贵，因此它不被认可和接受。

In the spring of 1942 three design groups submitted proposals to the NKV with 85mm tank gun projects: TsAKB (chief-engineer V. Grabin), Kalinin OKB #8, and Factory #92 KB (KB means design bureau) of chief-engineer V. Savin. All the design bureaus recommended utilization of the mounting and recoil systems of the ZIS-5 or F-34 76 mm tank gun, but mounting in them of the 85mm barrel with the ballistics of the type-1939 antiaircraft gun. For compensation of the recoil the TsAKB recommended increase of the recoil mass, OKB #8 -the employment of the muzzle brake of the anti-aircraft cannon, and Savin's design bureau -a redesigned muzzle brake.

1942年春，三个设计小组向NKV各自提交了85MM坦克炮的设计方案。TSAKB（总工程师V. Grabin），加里宁第8设计局，第92工厂设计局（总工程师V. Savin）所有的设计局都建议沿用ZIS-5或F-34 型76MM坦克炮的炮架和后坐装置。但安装一门基于1939型高射炮改进而来的85MM身管，为了补偿后坐力TSAKB建议增大recoil mass(?). 第8设计局使用高射炮的制退器。SAVIN设计局则重新设计一种制退器。

All three variants were rejected because at that time, in the opinion of the technical directorate of the NKV and the leadership of the NKTP, transition to an 85 mm gun was not justified because the per-round-fired cost of an 85 mm gun was significantly greater than that of a 76 mm gun. However, in 1943, after the appearance on the battlefield of the new German Tiger and Panther tanks, and also the inadequate high explosive effects of the 76 mm gun against new field fortifications, interest in the 85 mm gun re-emerged with new strength. Projects that had been suggested in 1941-1942 were reexamined, but the most promising of them -the Kalinin Factory #8 design -was rejected because it required use of a muzzle brake, which at that time was considered highly undesirable in a tank gun.

这三种设计方案都被否决了，因为此时，NKV的技术委员会和NKTP的领导层认为，85MM炮是没有理由接受的——85MM炮每发射一次的成本要远高于76MM炮。但是，到了1943年，战场上德国虎和豹式坦克的出现，以及76MM炮在打击新型野战防御工事!L)3rUO@mfT2时高爆弹威力不足的问题，导致了85MM炮计划被重新提起。 1941-1942年的计划得到了重新审核，但是当时最有希望的加里宁第8设计局的方案被拒绝。因为它要求使用制退器。那时在坦克炮上认为是非常不受欢迎的。

In the winter of 1943, the TsAKB completed the design of a new tank and self-propelled gun cannon, the S-18, which was approved by the NKV technical directorate. Factory #9 was ordered to prepare two trial models in March 1943 (at that time the TsAKB did not have its own production facility). But the preparation of these guns was protracted. When they were finally subjected to testing it was revealed that the guns had been prepared with deviations from the blueprints. Factory #9 KB, under the leadership of F. Petrov, argued that the modifications were appropriate. V. Grabin argued for his original design. Nothing came of the disagreement.

1943年冬，TSAKB完成了一种用于新型坦克和自行火炮的S-18型，递交给了NKV的技术委员会。第9工厂被命令在1943年3月生产二门测试型（此时TSAKB还没有自己的制造工厂）。但是生产这些火炮工作被拖延了。当他们最终进行测试时火炮已经明显偏离了原先的设计蓝图。由F.PETROV领导的第9工厂设计局坚持改进是正确的。V.GRABIN 则坚持他原先的设计，双方无法达成一致。

The test guns performed normally and rather than correct deficiencies that were uncovered during the tests, the designers and builders undertook liberally to pour dirt on each other. As a result, for testing of the first trial tank -"Object 237" -a non-working model of the S-18 gun was installed in its turret. After the deficiencies of the S-18 were exposed, it was not mounted on the tank but rather given over for prototypes of the SU-85 (SU-85-1 and SU-85-4).

测试火炮表现正常（？），但是在测试期间也暴露了一些问题。（请察看原文，可能有误）设计者和建造者开始互相指责。第一辆试验^.F:)W 8*]s坦克“237项目”一门“损坏”的S-18炮装在了炮塔上，在S-18暴露了一些缺点之后，它没有在坦克上使用，但是安装在SU-85的原型车上更加合适（SU-85-I和SU-85-4）。

Parallel with the development of the S-18, the TSAKB designed yet another variant of an 85 mm tank gun for the KV-1S and JS tanks, which was designated as the S-31. For this reason this gun was being developed right away in two variants -with the ballistics of the 85 mm anti-aircraft gun (muzzle velocity of 790-800 m/sec) and with improved ballistics (muzzle velocity of 880-900 m/sec). Factory #92 conducted the preparation and testing of the gun, which showed that in comparison with the S-18 the new cannons were much more technological (simpler and cheaper in production). However, the gun with the improved ballistics demanded development of a new propellant in the existing casing. This complex task was not resolved in the time allotted (by 1 October 1943) and all remaining efforts on the 85 mm tank gun were limited to the ballistics of the 85 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun Model 1939.

在S-18发展过程期间，TSAKB设计了另一种用于KV-1S 和JS 坦克命名为S-31的85MM坦克炮。因为要适应两种不同的坦克型号，S-31很快发展了二种变型——和85 MM防空炮弹道性能相同的（炮口初速790-800米/秒）和改进弹道（初速880-900米/秒）的。第92工厂完成准备和测试火炮。显示和S-18 相比新型火炮更加先进（生产上也更简单和便宜）。不过，改进弹道的火炮要求研制一种新型的推进剂在现有的炮弹壳内。这项综合性任务没有通过决议。1943年10月1日，所有继续的85MM坦克炮被局限于1939型85MM防空炮。

Meanwhile, the Factory #9 design bureau reworked the design of the U-12 gun and in May 1943 recommended their own variant of the 85 mm tank gun. The new model received the designation D-5T and differed from the U-12 in that it had a semi-automatic camming-type mechanism borrowed from the ZIS-5 gun, along with several recoil and return components. The solid construction of the gun and the small length of its recoil permitted it to be mounted in the turret of any existing heavy tank without reworking of the turret. The S-31 had an advantage over the S-18 by having a small recoil length and reduced mass of breech components, but it had a greater number of small parts that required precise machining.

同时，第9工厂设计局重;n4?a{/P1R K新完成了U-12炮的设计。1943年5月推出了他们自己的85MM坦克炮。新的型号接受了D-5T的命名，但和U-12不同是，它借用了ZIS-5炮的半自动凸轮系统式的机械结构，同时还包括一些后座和回复机构。炮身的固定结构和较小的后座行程允许它在不重新修改炮塔尺寸和结构的情况下安置任何一种现有的重型坦克上。S-31 比较S-18 的优势在于有一个较短的后座行程和缩短的炮尾结构，但它需要精密加工大量的小零件。

Four tanks (two IS and two KV-1S) armed with the 85 mm S-31 and D-5T guns were tested jointly. This test demonstrated the great operatio

The first KV-85s were re-worked from excess KV-1S hulls, welding up the hole for the ball-mounted hull machine gun. The incorrect opinion has appeared in Western literature that there was a "second version" of the KV-85 with a flexible front machine gun. This confusion most likely arose as a result of study by Western experts of the only KV-85 tank that has been preserved to this day (monument in Avtovo, St.Peterburg), where a mistake was made in the restoration process.

According to archival data, 148 KV-85 tanks were produced; they were sent to the front beginning in September 1943. Simultaneously, output of the KV-1S tank was continued until December 1943. Factory #9 was given an order for production of the D-5T, but it turned out to be rather difficult for the factory. The factory was completely incapable of simultaneous production of guns for the IS-85 and KV-85 and for the T-34-85. Factories #8 and #13 were dedicated to mass production of the D-5T. These problems with production of the gun prevented the KV-85 from becoming a mass tank.

By the spring of 1944 the IS-2 entered mass production with incomparably greater armament and armor, and the subsequent fate of the KV-85 (and also the IS-85) was sealedA great portion of the KV-85s in the guards tank breakthrough regiments ended up on the Southern Front (2nd formation), later the 4th Ukrainian Front, where they participated in the liberation of Ukraine and the Crimea. Because on the whole our tank was not superior to the German heavy tanks, battles were fought with varied success. The results depended primarily on the training of the crews of the opposing sides and on the tactics they selected for the engagement. The 34th Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment (TTPP) (total 20 KV-85 tanks), which together with the 40th Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (TSAP) (total 9 SU-152s), fought in the area of the village Ekaterinovka on 20-25 November 1943 as element of the 28th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

On 20 November both regiments in a two-echelon formation attacked enemy positions that in addition to artillery had Pz.Kpfw IV Ausf.H and Marder II self-propelled guns (up to 18) dug into their positions. In the course of the day the tankers and self-propelled artillerymen managed to capture the first lines of the German trenches, losing 6 KV-85 tanks (left in enemy-controlled zone) and 6 SU-152 guns in the process.

On the second day of the battle up to 10 Pz.Kpfw IV Ausf. H undertook a counterattack on the positions of Soviet troops. The attack was beaten off by the efforts of the infantry and both tank regiments, costing the enemy five tanks without any losses on Soviet side.

On 23 November all serviceable vehicles in the regiment again attacked the German positions, broke through their defenses, and advanced 5 kilometers in deep. An additional two KV-85 tanks were lost in this operation (one of them burned up). The 34th Guards TTPP was sent to the rear for repair on 23 November and only the 40th TSAP continued to fight until 28 November, losing one or two vehicles daily in combat. Along with the 19th Tank Corps, the 1452d Separate Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (SAP), which was equipped with 11 KV-85s, 5 KV-1S's, 6 SU-152s, and also 3 SU-76s, participated in the liberation of the Crimea. It seems that because of a severe shortage of self-propelled guns, someone decided to equip the SAP with KV tanks, which had the most destructive armament of all the tanks presented in the Crimea at that time.

The 19th Tank Corps had only the T-34-76s and light tanks, and the enemy had two brigades of assault guns: the 191st and 279th under the command of Major Mueller and Captain Hoppe (altogether the XVII German Army had 215 tanks and self-propelled guns, primarily the StuG III with 75 mm cannons). But for a number of reasons associated with the leadership of the operations, the regiment fought with the masterfully retreating German infantry, who broadly employed mines.

On 8 April 1944, in accordance with the order of the commander of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division, to which the regiment (11 KV-85, 5 KV-1S, 2 SU-152) was operationally subordinated, the tankers and infantry, who had concentrated 1.6 km south of Turetskiy wall, attacked the enemy positions from the west to capture the town Armyansk. Several minutes after the launching of the attack the regiment blundered into a minefield that was unknown for the Russians and therefore not marked on the map.

Sappers designated for mine clearing were on the tanks and could not dismount because the Germans opened up on them with all types of weapons. Paradoxically, three hours after the launching of the attack, the 1452nd SAP still managed to break through the enemy defenses, losing 1 burned-out KV-85, 3 KV-85s blown up by mines, and 5 KV-1S's, 4 KV-85s, and 2 SU-152s damaged by enemy gunfire. No personnel were killed, but 2 officers and 4 soldiers were wounded. The 3 remaining operational KV-85s and 5 KV-1S's with an assault force from 3rd Guards Rifle Division reached the town Armyansk at 14:00 on 8 April. The regiment had accomplished its assigned mission.

As a result of this battle, 11 pillboxes, 5 antitank guns, and up to 200 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. Thus, the basic losses in personnel and equipment were caused by insufficiently competent leadership, which was unable to organize coordination of various branches of troops during the breakthrough of the German defense. The regiment repaired its equipment until 10 April 1944 and on 11 April a tank group (3 KV-85s 2 SU-152s, 2 SU-76s) of 1452nd SAP again attacked the German defenses in the area of Ishun. Tanks supported the infantry of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division. Because reconnaissance was not conducted, the tanks rolled into an 8-meter antitank ditch and special tank traps that were similar to ditches. The attack failed. A pair of KV-85s and SU-76s was recovered from the ditches with the aid of tractors.

After this grievous experience of the use of heavy tanks, the command of 2nd Guards Army decided to make a radical change in the tactics of the employment of this unit. The more so because on 10-11 April the Germans began to organize the withdrawal of their forces toward Sevastopol. On order of the commander of 2nd Guards Army (#005/OP of 10 April 1944), the vehicles of 1452nd SAP and 512th Independent Flamethrower Tank Battalion (OOTB) were parceled out to army mobile detachments.

These detachments consisted of infantry on Studebaker trucks and also tanks and self-propelled guns, and had the mission as rapidly as possible to break through to Sevastopol. KV-85 tanks also were assigned to these detachments. Engagements with the StuG III were exceedingly few -the Germans were retreating under the cover of artillery and mine fields. A group under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Colonel Puzanov (1 T-34, 8 TO-34s, 4 KV-85s) liberated the towns Evpatoria, Saki, and Bakhchisaray. On 6 May 1944, once again formed into a unit, 1452nd SAP, now comprising only 1 KV-85 and 2 SU-152s, reached Sevastopol and fought in the area of Mekenziev Hills, supporting the 37th Guards Rifle Division.

On 9 May the two serviceable vehicles of the regiment, a KV-85 and an SU-152, broke into Sevastopol with the 264th Guards Rifle Regiment. The KV-85 rarely engaged enemy tanks and SP-guns during the liberation of the Crimea, and was employed primarily as a self-propelled gun for support of infantry. The employment of the KV-85 against the German heavy tanks Pz. Kpfw VI Ausf. H occurred in the zone of combat actions of 38th Army, 4th Ukrainian Front, on 28 January 1944.

During this battle Soviet tankers acted decisively and skillfully, not harboring any unfounded illusions regarding the training of the German tankers and the quality of their combat vehicles. An operations summary concerning the combat actions of armore

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