[烛光生存狂]-德国战斗工兵在行动

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特别提示：本帖子在 2010-5-12 13:21:20 由用户 412886049 编辑过

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/engassault/index.html

德国突击工兵战术

http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=45&t=21361&st=0&sk=t&sd=a

Hello folks a small units fight series from the engineers point of view.

The conquest of fort IX - Warsaw 26 sep 1939.

In advancing towards the capital city of Poland, along the road Wilanow-Warsaw, the Infanterie Regiment 10 was halted on its track before the Fort IX on 25 september 1939. The rapid conquest of that fort was essential so in order to do it the Pi Btl 88 was attached to the infantry unit. This very night the Engineer Commander met the Infantry Regiment Commanding Officer for planning the assault.

The main walls of the fort was about 1 meter thick, the ditch surrounding it was 4,5 meters deep and 18 meters wide with steep banks and filled with water. To the southeast the ditch was crossed by a road bridge and to the north a little pedestrian crossing could be seen.

After carried out the necesaries reconaissances, both commanders developed the following plan:

To attack simultaneously by three sides on 26 september at 05:00 hs.

To cross the ditch by using pneumatic boats if necesary.

To deploy the troops as is shown in the fig. 2.

The 2d company / Pi Btl 88 was attached to the 1st Battalion / IR 10; the 3d company / Pi Btl 88 was attached to the 2d Battalion / IR 10; the 1st company / Pi Btl 88 was organized as a supply unit.

On september 25 at night all the troops occupied its assembly areas.

The attack.

The attack went over at 05:00 hs on 26 september as ordered. It developed as follows:

In the north, the assault groups of the 3. Platoon, 2nd Company / Pi Btl 88, tried to cross the ditch through the pedestrian crossing supported by the fire of machinegun and mortars, but they failed suffering great losses. After two attempts the attack was called off.

The assaults groups of the 1. Platoon, 2nd Company / Pi Btl 88, jumped off towards the point A (see fig 2), carrying on its pneumatic boats with them, the infantry followed some distance to the rear. The movement was supported by some machine guns placed on the roof of some houses located nearby and mortar fire. The first boat hardly had touched the water when it was destroyed. This point was not good enough to cross the ditch, so the assault was called off too.

The forward infantry company (5./ IR 10) belonging to the 2nd Battalion / Infanterie Regiment 10 was checked by a machine gun nest while was attacking the road bridge. The 3. Platoon, 3rd Company / Pi Btl 88, was called forward and suppressed the nest after attacking it from the right flank with hand grenades.

Meanwhile, the 1. Platoon, 2nd Company / Pi Btl 88, had succeeded in taking the pneumatic boats to the point B (see fig 2) and this time the mission was accomplished. One infantry squad crossed in the first wave, the rest of the infantry company (3./ IR 10), part of the machinegun company (4./ IR 10) and the rest of the 2nd Company / Pi Btl 88, followed immediately. Shortly after that roughly 50 poles were taken as prisoners.

Whereas the troops were transfered on the western sector (point B), the 2nd Battalion / Infanterie Regiment 10 with the 3rd Company / Pi Btl 88 attached were advancing through the road bridge, already free of enemies.

Around 09:00 hs both engineers companies (2. and 3. / Pi Btl 88 ) met each other in front of the fort, at this time, the commander of the 3rd Company / Pi Btl 88 was killed in action.Yet, inside the fort, about 500 poles or so were eager to fight. The commanding officer of the Pi Btl 88 arrived on the spot and assumed the engineers tasks ( to breach the fort).

Around 11:00 hs. The commanding officer of the Infanterie Regiment 10 called back his troops, leaving to the engineers the task of suppressing the fort. A machinegun company and a Platoon of infantry cannons (75 mm) were attached to support the Pi Btl 88. After a quick survey the commander could ascertain that the weakest point were the walls, so ordered to open a breach there. An explosive charge of 13 kilograms of TNT caused minor damages (cracks only), an explosive charge of 45 kilograms of TNT created a hole of one meter of diameter. This was used as standard charge. Four charges were set on the western wall of the fort. Then hand grenades were thrown and flame thrower were used against each holes. An engineer assault group tried to break into the fort through one breach, but suffered great casualties and was called back. Meanwhile others engineers groups threw hand grenades, bombs of smoke through the ventilation pipes. Also oil was poured in the ventilation pipes, it was ignited with the smoke’s bombs.

Shortly before noon, several poles tried to surrender but were fired on by theirs comrades, finally at noon a white flag was seen and this time the polish garrison surrendered. 475 poles, among them 15 officers were taken as POW.

攻占IX堡垒--华沙，1939年9月26日

1939年9月25日，在沿着维拉努夫-华沙的道路向波兰首都挺进途中，第10步兵团的脚步被IX堡垒挡住了去路。为了拔除这个拦路虎，上级命令把第88工兵营加强给步兵团。当天夜里，工兵营长和步兵营长开始商议突击计划。

堡垒的墙有1米厚，绕城的沟渠有4.5米深，18米宽，四周陡峭，沟里还灌满了水。在沟渠东南方面有座路桥，在北面有一条仅供行人通行的小路。

在经过了必要的侦察后，两位营长拟定的计划如下：

9月26日05:00，从三个方向同时发起进攻。

如果有必要使用橡皮艇横渡沟渠。

部队部署如图2所示。

第88工兵营2连配属给了第10步兵团1营；第88工兵营3连配属给了第10步兵团2营；第88步兵营1连充当预备队。

9月25日晚，所有部队占领集结地域。

进攻

9月26日05:00进攻正式打响。具体情况如下：

北面，第88工兵营2连3排组织的突击队，在机枪和迫击炮的掩护下企图利用小路通过沟渠，但都遭受到了极大的损失。两次冲锋都被打了回来。

第88工兵营2连1排组织的突击队带着橡皮艇准备横渡到A点（图2），步兵则紧跟着他们身后。进攻得到了架设在附近房顶上的机枪和迫击炮的支援。可是第一艘橡皮艇还没出水就被击毁了。这里不是理想的横渡沟渠的地点，所以进攻也失败了。

第10步兵团2营5连在向路桥发起进攻时，被一个机枪巢拦住了去路。第88工兵营3连3排从右翼用手榴弹让它熄了火。

同时，第88工兵营2连1排成功的使用橡皮艇到达了B点（图2），同时任务完成。一个步兵班率先渡了过去，第10步兵团3连，4连部分和88工兵营2连部分紧跟其后。短暂的交火后，俘虏了大约50名战俘。

但被送到西面（B点）的部队——有88工兵营3连加强的第10 步兵团2营——正沿着公路桥前进，此地已无敌军。

大约9：00左右，两支工兵连（88工兵营第2、3连）在要塞前会合，这时88工兵营3连连长阵亡了。

第88工兵营3连连长已经阵亡。在堡垒里大约还有500人还在拼死的抵抗。第88工兵营营长亲自抵达前线查看工兵的进展（在堡垒上打开缺口）。

大约11:00步兵团长召回了自己的部队，只留工兵自己承担攻坚任务。一个机枪连和一个75mm步兵炮排为第88工兵营提供支援。在快速的审视了下堡垒城墙的情况后，决定在一个相对薄弱的地方炸出一个缺口。一个13公斤TNT当量的炸药包没有起到作用，在使用了标准当量的45公斤炸药包后，终于在墙上弄出了一个1米左右的洞。之后在堡垒的西墙上炸出了四个洞。对每个洞口都使用火焰喷射器和手榴弹。一个工兵突击队试图从一个缺口进入堡垒，但是遭到了重创只能折回。同时其他的工兵突击队往通风管里投掷手榴弹和烟雾弹。除此之外，把燃料也顺着通风口灌了进去，引爆可烟雾弹。

中午之前，几个守军企图投降但是被自己的同伴打死了。不过到了中午，波兰守军最终还是举起了白旗。包括15名军官在内一共有475人被俘。

Source: "Ingenieros en Combate". Brig Grl. Paul W. Thompson. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires

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特别提示：本帖子在 2010-5-12 0:01:37 由用户 412886049 编辑过

Hello folks; another little story, this time the Pi 28 was involved.

Captured of Fort Boussois. May 1940.

On 21 May 1940, at 13:30 hours, shortly after the conquest of the city of Boussois[布苏瓦], the 2./ Pi 28 (5 Offrs and 190 enlisted men) was informed that the company should reach an assembly area located northeast of Boussois where it should be reinforced with two 88 mm guns, two howitzers of 105 mm and two anti tank Platoons ( six guns of 37 mm) in order to seize Fort Boussois. The assault would be supported by one aerial attack performed by stukas.

Meanwhile the support weapons had arrived and taken position near the point 151,5 northeast of Boussois and at 750 meters east of the fort . The 2./ Pi 28 waited at the Boussois’s gardens but at 16:30 hours the Stuka attack did not come. At 17:00 hours the aerial attack was discharged and the company commander requested fulfill his mission without the Stuka support which was granted.

At 17:30 hours several reconnaissance patrols were sent and could advance as far as 100 meters from the fort. The fort was a big and modern construction, located onto the plateau of a key terrain feature raised there. Was splitted in two fortified groups, north and south, separated each other by 200 meters. Each group consisted in several armoured cupolas and pill boxes of reinforced concrete. The armoured cupolas (three in the north group, one of them mobile, and two in the south group) were armed with guns of 75 mm ( two each?) and all the constructions were linked by subways. The fort was protected by obstacles mainly barbed wires against troops and one ditch with concrete walls against the tanks.

The company commander was concerned about two aspects:

1. Nature and locations of all obstacles.

2. Nature of fortifications to include number and positions of embrasures, thickness of concrete, wood, steel or earth protection, entrances and exits, underground organization, number of men in each work or shelter, security measures, warning devices,and camouflage mainly of the cupolas, the assault’s main objective.

After the patrols arrival and with its information on hand, the company commander issued his plan as follow:

1. The support weapons ( 88 mm and 105 mm) located nearby point 151,5 should cover with its direct fire all the embrasures (specially the cupolas). The fire should be started at company commander signal.

2. The engineer company should attack with two Platoons in the first line. The 1. Platoon should seize the north group and the 2. Platoon should seize the south group. The 1. Platoon had attached one flame thrower to destroy the mobile cupola located in its objective.

Source: "Ingenieros en Combate". Brig Grl. Paul W. Thompson. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.

The attack will follows ASAP. Regards. Tigre.

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The assault.

The time for the attack was set up at 20:40 hours but at 20:00 arrived there one infantry Battalion to join the assault team. Thereforth the Battalion commander (Infantry) took over the operation and the attack was delayed. At 21:30 hours the fire support broke out and at 21:45 hours the attack went under way.

Pioniers nach vorn

The fire of support was inaccurate but the machine gun fire coming from the pillboxes and emplacements was well aimed so the attack was called off untill nightfall; when darkness fell each assault group sent one patrol to cut the barbed wires wich they did carefully and stealthy. The assault groups followed through the breach in the wires and at 01:45 (22 May 1940) reached the cupolas surrounding. When the engineers were attaching the explosive charges (TNT) against the walls, dors and embrasures one red flare (allegedly fired by one french patrol) raised from behind the fort. But, casually, this was also the signal waited for the heavy weapon to cover the engineers retreat and the hell broke out. The french defenders answered the fire and the engineers should withdraw through the gaps, the night attack was a failure.

Breaching the gaps

On 22 May 1940, after a new evaluation it was decided that the attack would be resumed at 09:30 hours without the infantry battalion, only two infantry platoons were attached as security against counterattacks and to occupy the works after its conquest. This time the aerial attack also was included. At 09:25 hours the Stukas appeared and bombed the fort during the following five minutes. Behind the last explosion (there were 18 ) the engineers Platoons jumped off. The last night scheme was repeated, but this time one 37 mm anti tank gun was attached to each assault Platoon. The fire support at close range and flat trajectory, was very accurate indeed and the engineers moved forward through the gaps breached the night before, the commander was surprised because the stuka’s bombs rendered little effect on the fortifications. When both groups reached the final line green flares raised from the field and the guns lifted the fire. The french weapon opened the fire but to late, the explosive charges were attached and blasted; also the mobile coupula was left out of action throwing bombs through its ventilation pipe.

The objective was reached

After several minutes most of the french fortifications were conquered and the enemy soldiers began to surrender, several white flags were seen through the embrasures all over the fort. The number of POWs reached to 6 officers and 180 enlisted men. The mission was fulfilled.

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Hello to all, another short story dealing with engineers.

Pioniers on the upper Rhin (Colmar) 1940.

The general situation as for Jun 15, 1940, was as follows: Army Group A had forced the river Somme and had taken Paris; Army Group B, carrying out the main effort with mechanized and motorized divisions had forced the river Aisne and was pursuing the French forces towards the Swiss border; Army Group C should carry out attacks with its 1. Army from nearby of Saarbrucken and with its 7. Army across the river Rhin.

The river Rhin, near Colmar, had a width of 225 meters and a speed of 3,5 m/s. To the west another two water courses were located, the Biesheimer-Rhin an old river bed canal and the Rhin-Rhone canal.

It was observed that the french soldiers surveyed the shore line during the night but were less actives at day light. It was decided then to take advantage of this so the attack’s hour was set up at 10:00 on Jun 15.

The IR 444, belonging to the 239 ID should attack with its I. Battalion on the left and the II. Battalion on the right. The II./ IR 444 should occupy an assembly area located southwest of Burkheim, the following formations were attached to it:

1 Pi company (perhaps belonging to the division’s Pi btl).

1 Platoon of infantry Cannons ( 2 guns of 75 mm).

1 Platoon of anti tank guns (4 guns of 37 mm).

The II./ IR 444 should attack with its 6. Company on the right and its 7. Company on the left; to each frontlines companies were attached 1 ½ Pi Platoon and 1 MG Platoon (4 MG) from the 8. Company (MG).

The 5. Company was Battalion reserve and should follow the assault behind and in the center. The Infantry cannon and anti tank Platoons and the rest of the 8. Company (MG) were in general support under Battalion commander orders.

The night from 14 to 15 Jun 1940 was dark and rainy; the companies movement was delayed by the rain and lasted up to 06:00 hours in the morning. When arriving the companies were leaded by the engineers, towards its crossing points and the waves were organized.

The german troops passed a wet an uncomfortable dawn in its readiness positions. On Jun 15 at 10:00 hours the fire support broke out, the anti tank and anti aircraft guns fired directly on the pill boxes and embrasures, the artillery fire lasted up to 10:10 hours and then the assault boats were launched. The rain had ceased and the visibility was good, the travel through the river lasted 20 seconds. The french advanced posts were totally surprised, nevertheless the attackers suffered great number of casualties due to sharpshooters located ontop of the trees and riflemen placed in fox holes nearby, also at least half of the assaults boats were out of service, some of them due to motor failure.

After reaching the far shore the II./ IR 444 seized the french first line of resistance and then reached the Bisheimer-Rhin. After reconnoitering, the engineer company commander informed that the water course was very deep to be forded and the shores were to soft for employing the neumatic boats (these kind of boats were carried by the reserve company, the 5. IR 444). However a ford was discovered north of Balzenheim, where one destroyed bridge was located. The reinforced battalion crossed there establishing a bridge-head. Early afternoon all the regiment (IR 444) also crossed through this ford.

The Biesheimer-Rhin crossing was over at 20:00 hours (15 Jun 1940) and the Battalion established a vivouac with both of its flanks on the water course. The crossing was a success but the field kitchen was not arrived yet and also fresh water was lacking.

At 21:00 the french positions along the Rhin-Rhone canal, in front of the II./ IR 444, were attacked by the Stukas; by this time the Infantry cannons Platoon and one Platoon of Light Artillery, furnished fire support and shelled Balzenheim, assuring the bridge-head. During the night from 15 to 16 Jun 1940 one Bau Pi Btl reached the destroyed bridge at Balzemheim to build up a new one.

Its follows ASAP

During the morning, 16 Jun 1940, the II. Battalion sent reconnaissance detachments towards the Rhin-Rhone canal, these detachments informed that:

a) there were several obstacles in the area, most of them barbed wires.

b) the french had retreated from the first line pill boxes, occupying instead positions behind some obstacles (barbed wires entanglements) on the canal nearest shore.

At 10:20 hours the regiment ordered the following:

“At 11:00 hours aerial bombarment (Stukas); behind the last attack the division (239 ID) will attack toward the Rhin-Rhone canal with artillery support”. Hence the Battalion commander issued the following order:

“ Time and date: 16 Jun 1940 at 10:30 hours.

1. Attacks with Stukas should end at 11:00 hours. Immediately we attack toward the Rhin-Rhone canal.

2. Formation the same that yesterday; 6. Company right, 7. Company left, 5. Company reserve (carrying neumatic boats). Engineers and MG Platoons should remain attached to the frontline companies. The 3. Platoon/ 8. Company should march behind the 7. Company under Battalion orders.

3. In case of ammo lacking, the reserve company should supply it.

4. After crossing the canal the Battalion will assemble on the road Durrenenzen - Urschenheim ready to march towards south.

The attack jumped off at 11:01 hours, the 7. IR 444 met two pill boxes (reinforced with concrete) linked by trenchs, this obstacle was knocked out and after overrun it, the company reached the canal shore line at 12:10 hours. The 6. IR 444 reached the canal at 12:30 hours. Some German soldiers crossed the canal by means of boats that were found along the bank. On the far shore one french supply depot was found so lack of rations was solved.

On 17 Jun 1940, the Battalion was assembled along the road and marched towards Belfort, following the Rhin valley with the 7./IR 444 ahead, then 6./IR 444, Engineer company, 5./IR 444.

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Somme 1940 - Pi Btl 88.

Last days of May 1940 - Pi Btl 88 reched Amiens’ neighborhood on the Somme river; after two or three days at Contay - Vadencourt, it moved into Vignacourt sector in order to prepare the river crossing (Somme).

After a detailed reconnaissance of the area and the preparation of the auxiliary material to be used in establishing a crossing , it was ascertained that the river had 28 to 30 meters in wide; the banks were steep. The river ran slowly and it was canalized there. The valley had 1200 meters wide with swampy lowlands covered with undergrowth and lagoons; the bridges were all destroyed.

The Pi Btl 88 was attached to the regiment located on the assault’s right sector (IR 42) and was organized as follows:

2. / Pi 88 (less one Platoon) should man the assault boats and built up foot bridges between Yzeaux and Bourdon.

1.Platoon / 2. Pi 88, should attack with the infantry waves in order to clear obstacles and road blocks.

3./ Pi 88 should built up one ponton bridge (3 tons) northwest of Bourdon.

The crossing should begin on 05 Jun at dawn. During the night of 4 / 5 Jun 1940 the Pi companies moved forward into their reconnoitered positions in readiness on the north bank with silent movements.

The assault.

05 Jun 1940 - At 04:00 AM the commander of the Pi Btl 88 informed the Division commander the unit was ready. At 04:30 AM the assault was launched and the crews carrying the neumatics boats moved from their assembly areas heading towards the river. They marched through the swampy lowlands following the paths reconnoitered and marked out before.

The enemy was surprised, the first wave gained the second shore and the landsers took cover in the undergrowth when hostile riflemen opened fire against them. The boats with its crews went back towards the first shore in order to carry the second wave.

The 2. / Pi 88 laid the foot bridges and the infantry began to cross when the french artillery shelled the crossing points. The fire was accurate and soon some bridges were destroyed the number of casualties grew under the withering fire. Some anti tanks guns were carried through the lowlands and ferried across the river on neumatic rafts.

On the right flank the 3. / Pi 88 had started to work on the bridge’s access, meanwhile other company Platoon crossed towards the second shore in order to reconnoiter and mark out the exit. Around 200 meters of corduroy road was laid down on the enemy shore and finally at 09:00 AM the first vehicle got across.

The Pi Platoon attached to the assault wave was employed in mopping out operations, clearing the woods located north of Cavillon.

On Jun 06, the Pi Btl 88 followed the bulk of the division (46 ID) across the Somme river and the 1. Platoon of 2./ Pi 88 was under company control again. The advance elements of the division were closing Bouganville.

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The Poix river crossing.

On Jun 07 the division reached another great obstacle, the Poix river. The river valley was heavily shelled by hostile artillery so the divisional commander halted the unit untill nightfall. One advanced assault detachment was organized which started its march on Jun 08 at dawn and after launching a lightning attack secured the river (Poix) crossing at Brissay. After that the 46 ID pressed on Grandvilliers. During that day the right flank was attacked several times by enemy tanks (possibly one british armoured brigade which was retreating towards Cherburg).

On Jun 09, the divisional vanguard, with the 3. / Pi 88 still attached, reached the Seine river at Vernon. The leading elements expected to seize the bridge located there intact but however it had been destroyed.

When this new was radioed back to the divisional HQ it was ordered that the bulk of the Pi btl 88 be conveyed towards Vernon (roughly 80 kilometers away) and about midnight the battalion was assembled nearby that town.

10 Jun 1940 - At 03:30 hours, after a short artillery barrage the 3./ Pi 88 conveyed the infantry troops towards the second river bank; the enemy resistance was lacking and after a while one infantry battalion and one machine gun company were on the other side. The 1. and 2./Pi 88 were building rafts in order to ferry the vehicles towards the other bank where was located the destroyed bridge. During the night of 10 / 11 Jun the crossing was treatened by floating mines; the number of mines increased on the morning of 11 Jun, so the engineers built up a wooden obstacle 4 / 5 kilometers before the crossing point.

12 Jun 1940 - During the night 11 / 12 Jun a pontoon bridge 190 meters long was built up in order to replace the destroyed one; it supported up to 10 tons. Over the bridge ran the traffic towards the south meanwhile the traffic to the north was ferried with two rafts.

On afternoon one lonely french plane knocked the bridge with one direct impact, four pontoons were sunk and 25 meters of bridge were destroyed, also six pioniers were killed. The bridge was repaired in four hours. During the night another isolated hostile plane dropped several bombs over one engineer platoon killling 5 and wounded 30 pioniers.

On Jun 14 the battalion marched again; the 3./ Pi 88 joined the advance guard and helped it to seize the bridges over the Eure river undamaged. On Jun 19 the 3./ Pi 88 attached to the vanguard reached the Loire river and conveyed the troops to the second bank during the night of 19/20 Jun making use of pneumatic boats. The crossing points were located at Chalonnes and Mont jean.

On Jun 20 reached the Loire river the balance of the division with the bulk of the Pi 88 (which travelled 160 kilometers that day). The 1. and 2./Pi 88 established a crossing point making use of rafts 3 kilometers west of Mont Jean. On Jun 21 in the morning the battalion was relieved and was to build up one pontoon bridge. It was finished at 14:00 hours and later two divisions got across towards the second bank. The battalion still was in charge of that bridge when the armistice was concluded.

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特别提示：本帖子在 2010-5-11 23:45:32 由用户 412886049 编辑过

Heroes of the “Fast Troops” - Heroic Action of an Engineer Lieutenant.

“Helden der Schnellen Truppen, Heroischer Einsatz eines Pionierleutnants”

[Die. Panzertruppen, March 1941. Translated f rom the German by Mr. LaVergne Dale at the Command and General Staff School.]

In accordance with orders of 19 June 1940, the advance detachment of the division was capturing the Epinal fortress on the Moselle. Part of the fortifications (not shown on the sketch) had been taken. The unseized portion (also not showed on the sketch), which seemed to be stronger, lay across the Moselle.

There was only one good bridge (B), of the six bridges across the Moselle[莫色耳河

(自法国东北部流入西德汇合莱茵河)] at this place, and it was already prepared by the enemy for demolition. Four bridges (not shown on sketch) had been destroyed completely. The other bridge (A) could be used only by motorcycles and light cars. Further attack and advance across the Moselle depend largely upon ability to take this last bridge (E) before it is blown up.

The French are defending from houses on the far side of the Moselle with machine guns ( E), antitank guns and rifles (E). A party of reconnaissance officers failed in attempting to reach the bridge and its leader, a lieutenant, was wounded. A German tank, about to cross the bridge, was put out of action (near C) when fired upon and is ablaze.

During the early part of the afternoon, while the French are still busy defending, a party of engineer shock troops and a group of infantrymen, organize under Lieutenant Danzer to cross the badly damaged bridge (A) in order to take over the bridge (B) which the French plan to blow up.

Sketch 1

Five enlisted men volunteer for the undertaking. Two parties are formed. Lieutenant Danzer leads one. A corporal leads another. They are to destroy fuses and detonating wires. The corporal arrives at the bridge but finds he cannot venture onto it from his (the German) side of the Moselle at point “C”. The troops cross the damaged bridge (A). The rifle troops proceed to attack houses in the far side of the city, while Lieutenant Danzer and his engineer troops cautiously advance through the streets parallel to the Moselle toward bridge (B). In searching several houses, they find 15 wounded French soldiers and 40 or 50 civilians in one of them. Six or seven French soldiers suddenly appear in a gateway with a machine gun, but again withdraw.

At Lieutenant Danzer’s request, one of them comes to him. He says he is an Alsatian and that the bridge (B) is about to be blown. He says a heavy mine barricade is on the bridge, connected by fuses with mine chambers, but that there is no special place for igniting the system. Lieutenant Danzer wants to assure himself of the correctness of these assertions, and goes to the corner building near the bridge with his men. From windows, there, he inspects the bridge and finds the assertions of the Alsatian to appear correct.

An antitauk gun found in the building (D) is put out of use by Lieutenant Danzer. It apparently had been the one used to disable the German tank across the Moselle.

Lieutenant Danzer senses the great tactical importance of preserving and capturing this last bridge across the Moselle for the advance of the division and the capture of the Epinal fortress. The brave officer is prompted to act without further orders and reinforcements. All depends on restoring the bridge to use and he decides to do this alone, believing that he can do it. In reply to those who should anxiously intervene he says, “It is time the bridge be Cleared!. I’ll do it ! I’ll succeed if it costs my life !“ He knew how dangerous it was. In order to acquaint the troops left on the far side of the Moselle with his plan, Lieutenant Danzer and one of the engineers recross the bridge at (A) and come to a corporal on their side of the Moselle. The latter’s party of engineers and riflemen. covering force are instructed by Lieutenant Danzer to cover him with machinegun and rifle fire while he works on bridge (B). Lieutenant Danzer and his engineer then take an old, light delivery truck and again cross the Moselle, and retrace their former route. The engineer gets out at the market place (q) and the lieutenant proceeds toward the bridge, with the car, driving right up to the barricade of mines.

He leaps from the car and begins to tear up the pavement as fast as possible, and working from left to right lying down at times, at times kneeling, as he works, cutting the fuses, digging out the mines and tossing them in a high arc over the railings of the 10-meter wide bridge into the Moselle. In the meantime, the enemy has noticed him and opened fire on him. ‘From our own side we are trying to beat down the enemy. Breathlessly our men watch the brave lieutenant who calmly goes on with his work on the bridge. He has not yet dug out all the mines when he suddenly seizes his throat. Field glasses reveal he is bleeding. He signals that he is wounded.

As developed later, he had been shot through the throat from in front. In spite of this, however, he continues to dig up the mines and, as if by a miracle, he finishes despite the

wound. He runs back to his comrades. On the way he stumbles over a wire, but is quickly back on his feet. All who are witnesses of this feat believe it to be accomplished. But, just as he reaches the end of the bridge he suddenly throws his arms into the air and falls again. From a cellar on the enemy’s side another bullet has struck him. The engineer closest to him hurries to him. With the help of a motorcycle dispatch rider of the rifle troops, he takes him out of reach of enemy fire. Lieutenant Danzer is suffering from a severe stomach wound. In spite of his severe wounds, his first words are:. “The main thing is that I cleared the bridge so that the division may advance.” On the very same day, Lieutenant Danzer was recommended for the Knights Cross in addition to the Iron Cross. But it cannot be conferred on him now, as he died the following day of his severe wounds.

Once before Lieutenant Danzer had distinguished himself with a similar feat. On the canal de le Basse near St. Omer, he protected a bridge that was about to be blown up by his

own personal intervention and in spite of enemy opposition removed the detonating conductors and captured the enemy detachment who were attempting to destroy the bridge.

He received the Iron Cross (I) for this, Lieutenant Danzer, born in Vienna, went from the Austrian Army to the German Army in 1938. He had already associated himself with the “great German idea” and bore a medal for the remembrance of the 13th of March, 1938.

He was happy in the post of a German officer and fought with all his heart for his Fuhrer and Greater Germany.

Source: “Helden der Schnellen Truppen, Heroischer Einsatz eines Pionierleutnants”

[Die. Panzertruppen, March 1941. Translated f rom the German by Mr. LaVergne Dale at the Command and General Staff School.]

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